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Abstract
The 2014 Ebola crisis killed 11,315 people across 6 countries, making it the deadliest
crisis globally since the virus was discovered in 1976. However, the roles played by
nonmedical emergency management agencies (EMAs) in Liberia and Sierra Leone
during that crisis remain unknown. The purpose of this study was to bridge the gap in
knowledge by documenting the roles which were played or should have been played
by EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone in responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis
involving policymaking in emergency management (EM). The research questions
focused on the roles that were played or should have been played by EMAs in Liberia
and Sierra Leone, as well as similar agencies in West Africa in responding to the
Ebola crisis. This study was a generic qualitative inquiry grounded in the
functionalist theory. Purposeful sampled interviews with 12 EM experts from Liberia,
Sierra Leone, and Ghana were used. An inductive thematic analytical approach was
used in the data analysis. The results showed that EMAs played crucial roles in
coordination, communication, and control of the movement of people. The study also
revealed that EMAs should have planned for unfamiliar hazards before the Ebola
crisis. Further, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should
have ensured the synergy of EM resources of its member states when responding to
epidemics that transcend international boundaries. Recommendations of this study
include, planning for unfamiliar hazards, and the need for ECOWAS to develop a
memorandum of understanding among EMAs of member states. This research
provides a blueprint on how EMAs can appropriately respond to unknown epidemics
in future to save lives in West Africa.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
In 2014, the Ebola epidemic ravaged West Africa. The situation devastated the
social cohesion of the most impacted countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea.
Although the West African outbreak of 2014 was not the first Ebola outbreak in the
world, the magnitude of this outbreak exposed the lack of national and regional
response to epidemics of such magnitude. The roles that were played or should have
been played by mandated nonmedical emergency management agencies (EMAs) in
Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as similar agencies in West Africa need to be
highlighted to prepare such agencies to respond to epidemics that transcend national
boundaries. This study therefore explored the key roles that were played or should
have been played by EMAs.
This chapter highlights the background of the study, which leads to the
problem statement, purpose of the study, and research questions. The chapter also
highlights the theoretical framework and nature of the study. It further defines
operational terminologies and assumptions as well as the scope, limitations, and
significance of the study.
Background of the Study
The Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak which adversely affected the Manor
River Region of West Africa in 2014 was the deadliest ever recorded in human
history. The 2014 outbreak that started in Guinea in December 2013 became the
deadliest since the virus was first discovered in 1976. By 23 October 2014, about
10,129 cases had been reported globally, with Liberia suffering 2,705 deaths (Ryan,
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2014). According to Hsu et al. (2018), 21 months after the first confirmed case,
which was recorded on 23 March 2014, the virus killed 11,315 people across six
countries: Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, the USA, and Mali.
The epidemic significantly stalled all socioeconomic activities in Guinea,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. According to the United Nations Sustainable Development
Group West for and Central Africa (2015), the EVD pandemic which hit “Guinea,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone is the longest, largest, deadliest, and the most complex and
challenging Ebola outbreak in history” (p. 1). The 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic was the
largest outbreak in history as 28,646 suspected, probable, and confirmed cases were
reported with 11,323 deaths by March 30, 2016 (Hsu et al., 2018). Guinea, Liberia,
and Sierra Leone had weak health infrastructure due to long histories of colonialism
and civil conflicts (Giugale, 2017; Keirns, 2015; Streifel, 2015). This subsequently
contributed to the significant impact the crisis had on nationals in the affected
countries.
The pandemic had a considerable impact on the socioeconomic development
of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. The World Bank in 2014 estimated that the total
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) loss of Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone combined
was about $2.2 billion. Prior to the epidemic, the World Bank had estimated a 2015
economic growth rates of 6.8%, 8.9%, and 4.3% for Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
Guinea respectively. However, at the peak of the epidemic, the World Bank (2014)
said, estimated growth for the three countries had reduced to 3.0%for Liberia, -2.0%
for Sierra Leone, and -0.2% for Guinea. According to a 2014 report of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), prior to the Ebola outbreak, Sierra Leone’s
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economy was buoyant and one of the fastest growing economies with a 11.3%
targeted growth rate for 2014. The IMF report also stated that the Government of
Sierra Leone had a long-term plan of attaining a middle-income status by 2035 and
possibly bringing this date forward before the Ebola crisis began.
From the onset of the epidemic, the responsibility of managing the crisis was
left to respective governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). However,
as the pandemic increased in pace, it became clear that the disease did not only pose a
threat to West Africa but also globally. The rapid increase of the infections of the
diseases therefore triggered a global response led by the United Nations (UN)
(Laverack & Manoncourt, 2015).
The 2014 Ebola epidemic that ravaged the Manor River area of West Africa
was the worst of its kind. Significantly, Ebola outbreak of such magnitude had never
been witnessed around the world, and as a result, all actors at national, regional and
the international community, were found wanting as the crisis escalated (Rothe et al.,
2015). According to the World Council of Churches, World Vision and the World
Health Organization (WHO), as referenced by Greyling et. al., (2017), various
stakeholders such as governments, international organizations civil society and the
faith sector, were all ill prepared for the scale and complication of the Ebola pandemic
and consequently delayed the needed response
In spite of the critical roles that were played by nonmedical EMAs in Liberia
and Sierra Leone during the crisis, available literature does not explain the significant
roles that such agencies played or should have played in responding to the Ebola
crisis. Further, available studies on the Ebola crisis do not explain the functions that
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were played or should have been played by EMAs at the regional level in West
Africa.
Background History of Liberia and Sierra Leone
Brief History of Liberia
Liberia had early contacts with Europeans in 1461 when the Portuguese
named the area the Grain Coast due to its abundance of grains (US, Department of
State, 2008). The British later established a trading post in the Grain Coast in 1663,
but the Portuguese destroyed the posts in 1664. This marked the last contact with
Europeans and the Western World in Liberia until freed slaves arrived on the coast in
the early 1880s. These freed African American slaves were later known as AmericoLiberians and established the capital city and named it Monrovia in 1820 after United
States President James Monroe founded the country. The country declared its
independence on 26 July 1847. Although Liberia traces its origins to US
colonization, Liberia was neither a formal colony nor territory of the USA. However,
the USA regards Liberia as an area of special interest (Whyte, 2016).
In the formative years of the country, the Americo-Liberians sometimes had
stiff and violent disapproval from the native people who felt they had been left out of
citizenship until 1904. Significantly, the style of governance in Liberia was fashioned
along similar lines as the United States. The political rulership was mainly in the
hands of the Americo-Liberians, who were about 5% of the population. The political
rights of the Indigenes had been circumscribed by the powerful Americo-Liberians.
The Americo-Liberian political elites under the True Whig Party dominated political
power from independence until 1980, when private and noncommissioned officers
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from the dispossessed majority staged a coup d’état under the leadership of Master
Sergeant Kanyon Doe (Yekutiel, 2013). The 1980 coup d’état effectively ended the
over 133-year monopoly of political power by the Americo-Liberians and ushered in
the People’s Redemption Council (PRC). The coupists publicly executed the deposed
President William Tolbert and several other members of his regime who were mostly
Americo- Liberians.
On December 24, 1989, a small group of insurgents under the leadership of
Doe’s previous procurement chief, Charles Taylor, entered Liberia from Cote d’Ivoire
(US Department of State, 2008). This insurgency later led to the killing of President
Samuel Kanyon Doe. On September 9, 1990, Doe was brutally murdered by Prince
Johnson, a former ally of Charles Taylor who had broken away from Taylor’s New
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and formed an Independent NPFL. After over 6
years of fighting, the war claimed at least 150,000 lives and displaced almost half of
the population (Peterson, 1996). The Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) intervened with the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a
multinational armed force and installed an Interim Government of National Unity in
October 1990 under the leadership of Dr. Amos Sawyer (US, Department of State,
2008). In July 1997, after hurried disarmament and demobilization of the warring
factions, general elections were held, and Charles Taylor emerged victorious. Later in
2003, because of Taylor’s misrule, former adversaries of Taylor started another war,
which eventually led to the resignation and exile of Taylor to Nigeria. ECOWAS
again intervened and sent 3600 peacekeepers under the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
(ECOMIL).
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Warring factions, political parties, and civil society later agreed and signed a
comprehensive peace agreement that laid the framework for a 2-year National
Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) under the leadership of Gyude Bryant.
Later in October 2003, by Security Council Resolution 1509, The UN established the
United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and assumed security
responsibility of Liberia after a comprehensive peace agreement was signed by the
feuding factions. UNMIL facilitated the peace and stability of the country, which saw
the election of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first female president in Africa. In
2014, the country was devastated by the Ebola epidemic which killed 11,323 people
around the globe by March 30, 2016 (Hsu et al., 2018). After President Sirleaf served
two 6-year successful terms in office, Liberians went to the polls and elected
President George Weah, who was sworn into office on January 22, 2018.
History of Sierra Leone
According to African International Mission Services (AIMS, n.d.), Sierra
Leone has been populated for 2.5 millennia by different groups of people from
various parts of Africa. The British in the 17th century set up a trading post near Sierra
Leone, first to trade in lumber and ivory, but later expanded into slave trade. A colony
was later established, and in 1787, after the American Revolution, Sierra Leone
became a destination for relocating black loyalists who had earlier been settled in
Nova Scotia, When the slave trade was abolished, the British sent many Africans who
had been liberated from the illegal slave trade to Freetown. Later, 1,200 Black Nova
Scotians who had earlier escaped slavery in the United States joined (A.IMS, n.d.)
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On April 27, 1961, under the leadership of Sir Milton Margai, Sierra Leone
became independent from the United Kingdom, and Margai became the country’s
first Prime Minister. Later in 1962, under the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP),
Margai won a landslide victory in the country's elections. After his death, his brother,
Sir Albert Margai assumed power as Prime Minister in 1964 and later attempted to
establish a one-party state but was resisted by the opposition All People’s Congress
(APC). In another general election in 1967, the APC candidate Siaka Stevens
emerged victorious as the Prime Minister. However, soon after taking office, he was
removed in a coup d’état led by Brigadier David Lansana. In April 1968, Brigadier
Lansana’s National Redemption Council (NRC) was toppled by a group of soldiers
referred to as the Anticorruption Revolutionary Movement (ACRM) led by Brigadier
John Amadu Bangura in another coup d’état. The ACRM jailed several members of
the NRC, reestablished the Constitution, and restored Siaka Stevens as the country’s
Prime Minister.
On April 19, 1971, Sierra Leone was declared a republic by its Parliament,
and Siaka Stevens was made the first president of the country and served two terms.
In 1978, the country’s parliament approved a new constitution, which made the
country a one-party state, and the APC, the only legitimate political party in the
country. After Siaka Steven’s retirement in 1985, the APC named General Joseph
Saidu Momoh as a new presidential candidate, who won in a one-party referendum on
November 28, 1985 to become the president.
In the early 1990s, a rebel group under Corporal Foday Sankoh’s
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) waged a rebellion on the Government of Sierra
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Leone from the East along the country’s borders with Liberia in a war that lasted 11
years. According to Binningsbø and Dupuy (2009), when the war ended in 2002,
between 30,000 and 75,000 people had died, and several other thousands had suffered
atrocities such as gang rape, sexual servitude, and mutilations. Although crimes were
carried out by both sides, the RUF was noted for amputating limbs of their victims.
In 1991, ECOMOG intervened and tried to support Sierra Leone’s army to
fight the rebellion. However, in 1992, a group of young military officers under the
leadership of Captain Valentine Strasser overthrew President Momoh’s government
amid the rebellion. The junta established the National Provisional Ruling Council
(NPRC) that ruled until 1996. Although Captain Strasser assured to hand over power
to a constitutionally elected government in 1996, he was overthrown by his second-incommand, Julius Maada Bio, in a bloodless coup in January 1996.
Bio voluntarily gave up power to Ahmed Tijan Kabbah on March 29, 1996,
after the latter had won a democratic election. On 25 May 1997, Kabbah’s SLPP
government was toppled by a group of soldiers who had formed the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under the leadership of Johnny Paul Koroma. The
AFRC teamed up with the RUF and ruled the country until February 13, 1998 when
in response to President Koroma’s request to the UN and ECOWAS to intervene.
ECOMOG troops stormed Freetown, ousted the junta, and reinstated him. President
Kabbah again overwhelmingly won a general election in 2002 and served a second 5year term in office until 2007 when he handed over power to Ernest Bai Koroma of
the opposition APC who won subsequent elections.
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President Koroma led the country for a decade after winning a second 5-year
term in office and handed over power to Maada Bio on 4 April 2018 after the latter
won the presidential election. Significantly, Bai Koroma’s tenure witnessed two of the
country’s worst disasters: the mudslide of August 2017, which killed more than 1000
people and the Ebola epidemic between 2014 and 2016.
Problem Statement
The significantly impacted countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea
were totally devastated by the EVD, leading to the death of several thousands of
people. According to Sy and Copley (2015), by March 2015, within a year after the
outbreak was declared, the EVD in West Africa had killed more than six times the
collective total deaths (1,560) from all previous Ebola epidemics in Africa. The EVD
did not only negatively impact the affected countries socioeconomically, but also
posed a threat to regional and global security (Bappah, 2015; Nakamura, 2014). As a
result of the devastating nature of the virus, President Obama, in his address at the
United Nations in September 2014 indicated that the Ebola epidemic had “become
more than a health crisis,” and was a “growing threat to regional and global security”
(Zavis & Hennessey, 2014, para 2).
At the peak of the epidemic in West Africa, social services in the affected
countries collapsed. The seriousness of the Ebola outbreak required the need for
improved emergency management (EM) systems and effective disaster response in
the concerned countries in particular and West Africa as a whole (Morton Hamer et
al., 2017). Although during emergencies of such magnitude, the appropriate
emergency management agencies of the affected countries are required to take a lead
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role in managing the crisis, such roles which were played or should have been played
by the non-medical EMAs of Liberia and Sierra Leone remain unknown.
Additionally, available literature on the Ebola crisis of 2014 does not highlight the
roles played by nonmedical EMAs in West Africa when responding to the crisis. The
study focused on this lack of information by describing the specific roles played or
should have been played by EMAs at the national and regional levels in dealing with
the 2014 Ebola epidemic in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this generic qualitative study was to learn about the roles
played by mandated nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone, at the national
level as well as similar agencies in West Africa in terms of managing the Ebola
epidemic of 2014. The researcher also highlighted the lessons that can be drawn from
nonmedical EM response to the Ebola crisis. This study was grounded in the
pragmatist and advocacy view, which according to Creswell (2014) means that
research inquiry needs to be interwoven with politics and public agenda. Creswell
(2014) further explained that pragmatism as a worldview arises out of actions,
situations, and consequences.
The 2014 Ebola crisis offers a good opportunity for EM experts to learn about
how to better handle similar crises elsewhere in future. Significantly, as the Ebola
crisis of 2014 increased in pace and it became more evident that it posed a significant
threat to global peace and security, a response from the UN was triggered (Laverack
& Manoncourt, 2015). However, not much is known about the roles nonmedical
EMAs of Liberia and Sierra Leone played in responding to the crisis. This research
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therefore described any roles that were played or should have been played by these
EMAs.
The study relied on primary data gathered from interviews with EM experts
from institutions in Liberia and Sierra Leone who played critical roles during the
response to the crisis. Data were also collected through interviews with selected
individuals from the National Emergency Management Organization (NADMO) of
Ghana as well as a subject matter expert from the Kofi Anan International
Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC). The goal of the study was to add
knowledge regarding how EMAs of countries should respond to national epidemics as
well as how such agencies should manage epidemics that concurrently afflict
numerous countries.
Research Questions
The researcher used the research questions for this study to fill a gap in
existing literature regarding EM. The research questions focused on the roles that
were played or should have been played by nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra
Leone, as well as similar agencies in West Africa when responding to the 2014 Ebola
crisis. The research questions were:
RQ1: What roles did nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone play
when responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis?
RQ2: What roles should nonmedical EMAs of Liberia and Sierra Leone and
similar agencies in West Africa have played when responding to the 2014 Ebola
crisis?
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Theoretical Framework
According to Ravitch and Carl (2016), the theoretical framework comprises of
a combination of a set of established theories about ways of framing the core
constructs embodied in a research question (Kindle Locations 1426-1427). In the
view of Vinz (2015), the theoretical framework further provides scientific validation
for research as it shows that the study is based on scientific theory. This study was
grounded in the functionalist theory, which is based mainly on the works of Herbert
Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton. The theory holds that
“society is a system of interconnected parts that work together in harmony to maintain
a state of balance and social equilibrium for the whole” (Mooney et al., 2007, p. 1).
The functionalist theory places emphasis on the fact that society is made of parts
which are interconnected. The theory highlights that each part impacts others and is
also influenced by other parts. It is important to recognize that in EM, different
agencies and organizations play different roles when dealing with a crisis. It is also
worthwhile to understand the usefulness of the important roles played by each
stakeholder, to be able to effectively manage epidemics such as Ebola in future.
Nature of the Study
The study was a generic qualitative inquiry with a focus on pragmatic
descriptive method. There are different approaches in a qualitative study, which
include phenomenology, grounded theory, or ethnography as well as generic
qualitative inquiry (Lambert & Lambert, 2012; Percy et al., 2015; Kennedy, 2016).
Percy et al. (2015), elucidated that generic qualitative inquiry examines people's
accounts of their subjective opinions, outlooks, opinions, or reflections on their
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experiences, of things in the outer world. A generic qualitative inquiry according to
Caelli, as referenced by Cooper and Endacott(2007), attempts to find and understand
a phenomenon, a process, or the outlook and worldviews of the people involved.
Selecting a particular research approach should not only be informed by the
worldview assumptions of the researcher and process of enquiry, neither should it be
just by preference of the researcher, but should rather be determined mainly by the
research questions (Creswell 2014, Marshal 1996). The researcher believed that in
doing research, emphasis needed not to be placed on the method but rather the
problem. The focus of the researcher was to use any possible means to gather data and
analyze them to answer the research questions.
In this generic qualitative inquiry study, the researcher used the purposeful
sampling method and identified EM experts from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana,
and collected data through interviews with respondents. Although the study focused
on Liberia and Sierra Leone, the collection of data from respondents in Ghana
highlighted the perspective of EM response to the Ebola epidemic from the broader
West Africa perspective. All data were transcribed, coded, and converted to
categories and themes. The inductive thematic analysis approach was used to analyze
all data to arrive at findings and conclusions.
Operational Definitions
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD): According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), (2017), EVD is an unusual and lethal disease which usually affect
humans and nonhuman primates. EVD is caused by an infection of one of the five
known Ebola virus species. These species include Ebola virus Zaire, Ebola virus
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Sudan, Taï Forest virus (Côte d’Ivoire), Bundibugyo virus, and Reston virus (Reston
ebolavirus), which is known only to affect nonhuman primates and pigs . According
to the Public Health Agency of Canada (2014), a person is said to be infected with
EVD if he or she presents a fever of more than 38 degrees Celsius and exhibits at least
one other symptom such as malaise, myalgia, and severe headache. Other symptoms
include conjunctival injection, pharyngitis, severe abdominal pain, vomiting, bloody
diarrhea, bleeding not associated with injury, and unexplained hemorrhage.
Emergency Management (EM): According to Sylves (2015), EM is primarily
the organization and management of the resources of communities or countries to
reduce risks relating to severe events that have catastrophic consequences. Efforts are
usually made for the reduction of losses and costs through the execution of strategies
that encompasses the entire cycle of disasters such as preparedness, response,
recovery and mitigation. In the context of this study, the definition of emergency
management includes the non-medical aspect of dealing with risk and the avoidance
and prevention of risks associated with the Ebola Virus Disease.
Epidemic/Pandemic:The rapid spread of highly infectious or contagious
diseases to several people within given population in a very short period of time.
Assumption
Interview responses involved opinions and personal professional experiences
of respondents in terms of managing disasters. Although such opinions may not be
verified as factual and true and could affect the authenticity of the research findings,
the researcher assumed that such responses were accurate and subjected them to
analysis to arrive at conclusions and recommendations.
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Scope and Delimitations
This research only sought to describe and document the roles that were played
or should have been played by mandated nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra
Leone during the 2014 Ebola crisis with the view to enriching EM policymaking. The
study did not cover activities, functions, and responsibilities of EMAs in Liberia and
Sierra Leone in terms of managing other natural or humanmade disasters. The study
did not also explain the roles of other nonmedical stakeholders such as international
NGOs and other actors who may have played significant roles during the 2014 Ebola
crisis.
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea were the countries that were significantly
impacted by the EVD in 2014. To explain the work of nonmedical EMAs in affected
countries, it would have been prudent to consider the three most impacted nations.
However, due to the researcher’s limitation in terms of speaking French, the study
only focused on Sierra Leone and Liberia and did not include Guinea. In addition to
data that was collected from Liberia and Sierra Leone, the researcher also collected
data from EM experts in Ghana to give a broader West African perspective of EM
response to the Ebola epidemic.
Limitations
One of the key limitations of this study is the fact that the responses from
participants were based on the subjective professional experience from the limited
roles they played during the Ebola crisis. The responses from participants were
therefore, quite subjective and may not represent the actual state of affairs as far as
leadership and decision making in the respective EMAs were concerned.
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Additionally, although the researcher identified and contacted 19 EM experts, only 12
of them agreed to participate in the study. Therefore, the findings of this research may
not reflect the views of all EM experts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana. Further,
no data was collected from other stake holders nor ECOWAS. Therefore, there were
no corroborative views or counter views from persons outside EMAs in Liberia,
Sierra Leone and Ghana.
Significance of the Study
The study explains how nonmedical EMAs should have managed the Ebola
crisis in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The research revealed how the mandated EMAs in
Liberia and Sierra Leone could apply the essential skills of EM to combat national
and universal epidemics of disastrous magnitudes in the future. The research will also
be useful for nonmedical EMAs in many countries who may be confronted with
managing future epidemics not only in their respective countries but also contributing
towards a regional and global response to epidemics. This research may positively
impact social change through the development of a blueprint on how EMAs can
appropriately respond to unknown epidemics to save lives in West Africa in future.
Summary
This chapter highlights historical information about Liberia and Sierra Leone.
The goal for this study was to explore the roles that were played or should have been
played by mandated EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the Ebola outbreak of
2014, which devastated these countries. Available literature which is reviewed in
Chapter 2 shows a gap in this area of study. The study therefore employed a generic
qualitative inquiry methodology with a focus on the pragmatic descriptive method to
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investigate the possible roles that were played or should have been played by EMAs
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as such similar agencies in West Africa in
responding the 2014 epidemic. This enabled the researcher to determine the key roles
to be played by EMAs in managing epidemics that transcend the boundaries of
countries.
Chapter 2 highlights scholarly information about the Ebola crisis of 2014. The
methodology used in this study is outlined in Chapter 3. The researcher discusses data
collection, analysis and results in Chapter 4, and draws conclusions and makes
recommendations in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
This qualitative research aimed to describe the roles played by nonmedical
EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as similar agencies in West Africa when
responding to the Ebola epidemic of 2014. The study suggests roles that should have
been played by EMAs before, during, and after the Ebola crisis. This chapter involves
studies regarding the Ebola epidemic and EMAs. In this chapter, the researcher
highlights strategies used for the search through available literature and the theoretical
framework . During the review of available literature, the researcher realized that
there was no available information on how EMAs responded to the 2014 Ebola crisis.
Themes include the history of the Ebola epidemic, sociopolitical factors that
led to the rapid spread of the disease, the failure of systems in Liberia and Sierra
Leone which contributed to the spread of the virus, and the effect of the Ebola
epidemic on socioeconomic development of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Other themes
discussed in this chapter include international panic and stigmatization of Africans,
weaponization and bioterrorism of Ebola virus, the national response of Liberia and
Sierra Leone to the crisis, the response of the international community to the crisis,
and the involvement of the militaries of Great Britain and the United States of
America who responded to the epidemic.
Strategy for Search of Literature
The researcher used multiple databases to identify peer-reviewed literature on
the subject mainly from the Walden library, google scholar as well as open source
information. Books and articles were also retrieved from databases including EBSCO,
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Jstor, Project muse, Arts and humanities, Political science, Research library social
science, ProQuest, Pdfdrive.net, Gutenberg.org, and Archive.org. The researcher used
keyword such as, Ebola, emergency, disaster, management, response, planning,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, to search through the databases. The researcher combined and
paired the words differently to search through all the databases. All the literature
found from the search were within a five-year range between 2014 and 2019.
Theoretical Framework
This study was guided by the functionalist theory. The functionalist theory is
based mainly on the works of Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton.
The theory holds that “society is a system of interconnected parts that work together
in harmony to maintain a state of balance and social equilibrium for the whole”
(Mooney et al., 2007, p. 1). The theory emphasizes the importance of allowing each
component of society to play its function to support other components to eventually
complement the effective functioning of the whole society. According to Fletcher
(1956), Durkheim's work was mainly based on what he referred to as "social facts"
which meant values, cultural norms, and social structures that exist outside of the
individual but have influence on the individual. Fletcher (1956) further highlighted
that in Durkheim’s work titled “The Rules of Sociological Method,” Durkheim
surmised that to get a deeper understanding of social facts the historical antecedents,
and an analysis of the functions of these social facts regarding the social ends they
serve, are crucial.
According to Trueman (2018), Parsons viewed society as a system that has
four basic functional rudiments namely, adaptation, goal attainment, integration and
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pattern maintenance. Trueman (2018), highlighted that from the perspective of the
Parsons theory of functionalism, all parts of society can be primarily understood by
considering the roles they perform in a society.
Within the functionalist theory, the diverse parts of society are principally
composed of social institutions, each of which is meant to fill various needs. Each of
the institutions has specific roles in forming and shaping society (Crossman, 2018).
The functionalist theory of society is usually likened to the human body where the
entire body represents the entire society, and the parts in society represent the various
body parts of the human body. The parts of the human body complement each other
to facilitate the proper functioning of the entire body. Similarly, when the various
components of society play their ascribed roles, they complement each other for the
society to run efficiently (Fletcher 1956).
It is important however to underscore that the functionalist theory has been
criticized by several scholars. Despite Durkheim's clarity that the historical
antecedents and functions of social facts complement each other, some scholars have
criticized the theory emphasizing on the functional elements of the theory and
neglecting the historical perspective (Fletcher 1956). Among the criticisms of the
functionalist theory is that factionalism risks being misled by their theoretical
assumptions to misjudge the degree of functional unity in a social structure (Fletcher
1956). It is imperative to note that it cannot be correct to assume that all social
grouping such as political parties, trade union groups, governments, other interest
groups, etc. all work for the collective good and harmoniously in a society (Fletcher
1956 p. 38). Another significant criticism of the functionalist theory is the
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implications the theory has on policymaking. The theory seeks to advocate that
established institutions are indispensable and inviolable just because they are in
existence (Fletcher 1956). According to Crossman (2018) critics, such as Antonio
Gramsci, have argued that the functionalist theory validates the status quo and is
maintained by the course of cultural hegemony. The theory further discourages people
from taking active roles in social change even when such changes in society may
benefit them.
In spite of the cogent criticisms leveled against the functionalist theory, the
researcher considered that it is the appropriate theoretical approach for this study. The
researcher considered all other stakeholders in EM such as INGOs, military, medical
establishments, non-medical emergency management agencies, relevant government
ministries, and agencies, among others as being part of the collective whole. The
researcher, however, drew a distinction among roles of various stakeholders and
highlighted the specific roles that the nonmedical EMAs played or should have played
to complement the collective whole, in managing the Ebola epidemic.
History of the Ebola Epidemic
According to Simon (2014), The first recording of Ebola outbreak was on 27
June 1976 in Nasara, Sudan, where after 5 days of exhibiting symptoms of diarrhea,
vomiting, and high body temperature the virus claimed the life of its first ever victim.
Subsequently, 151 others died out of 288 cases of infections that were reported.
Simon (2014), said that the Ebola outbreak again occurred within months of the first
outbreak in Nasara, this time in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo
[DRC]) with 280 out of 318 infected people in that country losing their lives.
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According to the WHO (2018), however, there were simultaneous outbreaks in
Nasara (South Sudan) and Yambuku (DRC Congo) in 1976 near the Ebola River,
from where the virus derived its name. Subsequently, as of 2016, the Ebola virus had
killed nearly 41% (9,604 out of 23,729) of people infected internationally (Maras &
Miranda, 2016). In spite of the fact that the first Ebola outbreak was recorded in 1976,
the Ebola virus only became extensively known in the early 1990s (Fidler, 2015).
The scale of the EVD epidemic that occurred in West Africa in 2013–2015
was unparalleled in human history. According to Oleribe et al., (2015), before the
2013-14 outbreak in West Africa, there had been about 23 other outbreaks mainly in
East and Central Africa, with about 2,500 cases. The countries that had suffered
outbreaks included the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Gabon, Ivory Coast,
Uganda and Congo-Brazzaville. Before the West Africa outbreak, the largest EVD
epidemic occurred in 2000 in Uganda with a total of 425 reported cases out of which
224 people died, representing 53% fatality (Cenciarelli et al., 2015a; Kinsman, 2012).
Since the first case of Ebola was reported in 1976, and before the 2013 outbreak in
West Africa, 1,527 victims out of the 2,306 reported cases had died, representing 66%
fatality rate (Kinsman, 2012).
The 2013 outbreak was the first of its kind in West Africa (Kissi 2014). The
disease broke out in December 2013, in a small village in Guinea (Hood, 2015).
According to Yan and Smith (2015), the first infection in the 2013 outbreak can be
traced to an unknown two-year-old toddler, Emile, now referred to as patient zero,
who contracted the disease in December 2013 exhibiting fever, black stool, and
vomiting, and died four days after on December 6. Within a month, his young sister,
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mother, and grandmother also died with similar symptoms. In the next couple of
months, the disease spread to the other parts of the country, and within months the
virus had jumped the border into Liberia and later spread into Sierra Leone (Hood,
2015; McInnes, 2015). On August 8, 2014, as a result of the severity of the epidemic
in West Africa, the WHO declared the situation a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern (PHEIC) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2017a).
As at March 29, 2016, when WHO lifted the PHEIC status, a total of 3,814 suspected
probable or confirmed cases had been reported in Guinea with 2,544 deaths. (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention 2017a),
The Ebola disease was first reported in Liberia in the Lofa County in March
2014 by the Ministry of Health. (Lindblade et al., 2015; Bowles et al., 2016, p. 271).
In spite of early calls for a national and international response, the spread of the
disease overtook the capabilities of authorities and spread very fast to other parts of
the country (Bowles et al., 2016). The virus quickly spread to Monrovia, the capital
city by the end of May, and by August, 10 out of the 15 counties of the country had
been infected by the virus and by December 2014, several outbreaks were detected in
remote rural areas of the country (Lindblade et al., 2015). According to the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (2017 a), Liberia was initially declared free from
Ebola in May 2014. However, other cases were later seen and treated, with the
country being redeclared free from Ebola in September 2015. After that, additional
cases were found and dealt with until January 14, 2016, when the country announced
that it was Ebola-free with no additional cases being found. The disease was later
spread to other countries such as Nigeria and the United States. At the end of the
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crisis, Liberia recorded a total of 10, 678 suspected, probable or confirmed cases with
4,810 deaths.
In Sierra Leone, the virus was probably first brought to the country in May
2014 when people returned from Guinea after the funeral of a traditional healer who
got infected and died trying to cure victims of Ebola in Guinea. According to a WHO
(2018), report however, investigations later revealed that the country's first case was a
female who was a guest at the home of an Ebola victim in Guinea. When her hosts
fell sick, she returned to Sierra Leone and died there soon after. However, her death
was neither investigated nor reported on time. The disease quickly spread through the
country and by July 2014 cases had been reported in Freetown, the capital and many
other parts of the country. As at December 31, 2014, a total of 9446 confirmed cases
were reported, including 2758 deaths in Sierra Leone (Cenciarelli et al., 2015a). By
March 29, 2016, when WHO lifted the PHEIC status, Sierra Leone had recorded
14,124 suspected, probable or confirmed cases with 3,956 fatalities (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2017a).
In addition to the profoundly hit countries of Liberia Guinea and Sierra Leone,
other countries in West Africa such as Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali, had infections but
were rapidly dealt with. According to Oleribe et al. (2015), the first case of Ebola
entered Nigeria on 20 July 2014, when a Liberian diplomat, Patrick Sawyer, traveled
to Nigeria. After suspicion on ten diagnoses on 23 July, Sawyer was confirmed
positive to the Ebola virus on 25 July, the day he died. The disease eventually spread
to the southern city of Port Harcourt, through an individual who was under
surveillance and had traveled to the city to get secret treatment. Unlike Liberia,
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Guinea, and Sierra Leone, Nigeria managed to contain the situation, and as at the time
WHO lifted the PHEIC status, Nigeria had a total of 20 suspected, probable or
confirmed cases with eight fatalities (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2017 a).
The only case of Ebola reported case in Senegal occurred when a student from
Guinea-Conakry traveled to Senegal. When he was seen to exhibit symptoms such as
diarrhea and fever, he was treated for malaria and later sent to the University Hospital
in Dakar on 29 August 2014, where he was diagnosed as Ebola patient and treated
(Oleribe et al., 2015, p). In Mali, eight suspected, probable or confirmed cases were
reported with six fatalities. It is important to underscore that countries such as Italy,
United Kingdom, and Spain had a case each of Ebola infection but was all treated
with no deaths. The United States, however, had four confirmed cases with one
fatality. The victim had traveled to the United States from Liberia to the United
States. He was isolated for treatment but later died.
Although non-medical emergency management agencies have important roles
to play in the management of epidemics, it is noteworthy to underscore that in all the
known outbreaks, the role of such non-medical emergency management agencies has
not been highlighted in all the available literature.
Sociopolitical Factors Leading to Rapid Spread of the Virus
During the 2014 epidemic, between December 2013 when the virus claimed
its first victim in October 2014, the disease had killed 4,951 people and infected 13,
567 others, “crippling families, health systems, incomes, food supply and economies”
of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in its wake (Wilkinson & Leach 2015, p. 136).
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By the beginning of 2014, the infection rate was rising exponentially as the number of
infections doubled every 20 to 30 days (Hood, 2015). Several reasons account for the
rapid spread of the Ebola Virus from the beginning of the first recorded casualty in
Guinea and its subsequent spread to Liberia and Sierra Leone and further to other
countries. Among the reasons include, cultural practices and poverty, the apathy of
the Governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia at the onset of the epidemic, poor public
education, and slow response from the international community, among others.
High levels of poverty and cultural practices and beliefs contributed
significantly to the spread of the virus (Forestier et al., 2016). Chan, (2014) observed
that large numbers of people in the expressively impacted countries of the Ebola
epidemic do not have stable remunerated employment, a situation which fuels
population movements across borders in their quest to find work. By this movement
of people between Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and to other countries outside
the West African region, infected people "carried the virus along" and infected people
in other countries. Further, many socio-cultural and customary practices such as
shaking hands, traditional ways of nursing the sick, initiation rites and burial rituals
were identified as major causes of the rates of Ebola transmission (Gbla, 2018).
Bell et al. (2017) argued that the Ebola outbreak rather eroded cultural ties and
significantly changed the cultural behavior of the people who were significantly
impacted. Consequent to the Ebola outbreak, people stopped relating normally with
others in the communities. It is quite customary for Liberians, for instance, to eat
together, hug each other and shake hands, however, because of the Ebola outbreak,
these practices had changed. Bell et al. (2017), further highlighted that West Africans

27
often view burials as a celebration of life and are entrenched with rituals such as
bathing and preparing a dead body. However, because of the Ebola outbreak, there
has been a significant shift in such cultural and traditional practices.
According to Forestier et al., (2016), the first casualty of the West African
Ebola outbreak of 2014 occurred when the victim, an 18-month-old child died on 26
December 2013, within two days of becoming ill. By the second week of January,
several members of his family together with many community health workers also
died . Although these deaths should have immediately alerted officials, it was only on
24 January 2014 that the first public health alert was issued even though initial
investigations concluded that the victims had died of cholera. Despite the seriousness
of the issue, there were no further public health alerts until 1 March 2014. Even after
the virus had entered, Liberia and Sierra Leone, government officials, were very slow
in responding to the epidemic, a situation which allowed the virus to gain roots in the
two countries.
Also, inadequate and misleading public education significantly contributed to
the spread of the virus. Among the public education that was churned out was that the
people should not eat bushmeat, and a consumption ban was subsequently put in place
in Guinea (Wilkinson & Leach, 2015). This message was misleading to the extent that
although the Ebola virus was traced to fruit bats, its subsequent spread was mainly
human to human transmission. (Wilkinson & Leach, 2014). The role of bushmeat had
erroneously emerged even in the theoretical discourse on Ebola, although, some
evidence took cognizance of the fact that the Ebola virus was characterized by a
single zoonotic source, while its subsequent infections were exclusively human to
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human transmission (Sastry &Dutta 2017). Another significant factor that contributed
to the rapid spread of the disease was the fact that rumors circulated that health
officials were responsible for the spread of the disease and subsequently, some
communities completely shut themselves off. Patients were even removed from
treatment facilities, and health centers attacked (Wilkinson & Leach, 2014).
The slow response of the international community also contributed to the
containment of the epidemic. At the onset of the Ebola crisis, both national
governments of the significantly impacted countries and the international community
were slow in responding, a situation which facilitated the wide spread of the virus
from Guinea where it first occurred, to neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone. There
was a lack of coordination between the Ministry of Health in Guinea and the WHO, at
the onset of the outbreak in Guinea. This situation compounded by the proximity of
where the outbreak began, and boundaries among Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone
led to an easy spread of the virus to neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone (Wilkinson
and Leach, 2014). The WHO only announced on its website on 23 March 2014 after
the virus had infected people in neighboring Libera and Sierra Leone. (Forestier et al.,
2016)
It is important to note that at the onset of the epidemic if the non- medical
emergency management agencies in the impacted countries had responded rapidly,
the outbreak would most probably have been contained to avoid its uncontrolled
spread and the vast loss of life in the affected countries. However, minimal literature
exists on the roles played by these agencies. The need for the development of the
EMAs in these countries can therefore not be overemphasized.
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Systemic Failure Contributing to the Spread of Ebola
Epidemics, when they strike can be very destructive to society and the health
infrastructure of countries. According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (2017b), epidemics could sometimes lead to millions of mortality cases
and devastate the healthcare systems of the affected country. In the view of RoemerMahler and Rushton (2016), the outbreak of the EVD that ravaged Liberia, Guinea,
and Sierra Leone in 2014 was in several ways an exceptional epidemic. The Ebola
epidemic also revealed the weaknesses in the health delivery system of the affected
countries. According to Ifediora, and Aning, (2017), the Ebola outbreak did not only
expose the challenges of national, regional and global bodies but also the weaknesses
of various institutional frameworks that should have been competent to manage the
outbreak. Researchers have ascribed several causative factors to the breakdown of the
health delivery systems in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Anderson & Beresford 2016;
Bappah, 2015; Moran, 2015; Kissi, 2014). As at the time the Ebola outbreak occurred,
the public health infrastructure system in all the seriously impacted countries was
woefully short-staffed and not adequately funded (Comfort et al., 2016).
The decades of civil wars the broke out in Liberia, and Sierra Leone had a
grave consequence on social services in the two countries. This negatively impacted
the healthcare systems in the affected countries to the extent that when the Ebola
crisis started, the fragile health systems in place could not adequately contain the
outbreak. For instance, in 2013, Sierra Leone had 0.2 doctors and 1.7
nurses/midwives per 10,000 population, compared with 7.8 and 49, and 27.9 and 88.3
in South Africa and the United Kingdom respectively (Fitzgerald et al., 2016). The
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state of affairs in healthcare delivery in neighboring Liberia and Guinea were no
different. Although a gloomy picture of healthcare delivery has been painted in
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, Comfort et al. (2016) highlighted that between
2007 and 2011, the Liberian Government had managed to double the number of
healthcare workers from a low of 3,996 to 8553. The Liberian Government also had
plans to increase the number to 15000 by 2021 and increase per capita expenditure on
healthcare from $18 in 2011 to $44 by 2021. With the population of healthcare
workers in Liberia and Sierra Leone this low, it is not surprising that the Ebola
epidemic could not be effectively managed by healthcare workers in the two
countries, resulting in several deaths before the intervention of other external
respondents.
Moran (2015), compared the outbreak and uncontrollable spread of the disease
in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, to the cases that were reported in Nigeria,
Senegal, and Mali and argued that Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone which were
mainly impacted by the crisis had weak health systems because of wars. Nigeria,
Senegal, and Mali, on the contrary, had good public health systems and as a result,
were able to better deal with the outbreak. The broken health system in Liberia
Guinea and Sierra Leone can also be blamed on public policies some of which were
prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as well as
international help requirements that removed state financial funding for health
education (Kisi, 2014).
It is also instructive to underscore the fact that even before the Ebola outbreak
in West Africa, several African countries had broken health care systems. This
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situation, which Kissi (2014), describes as “the criminal neglect of the health
infrastructure of the affected countries by dictatorial governments and their officials
who have amassed tremendous wealth” (p. 2). This epic description of the health care
system in West Africa was a significant cause of the easy spread of the epidemic
among the three most impacted countries by the Ebola epidemic.
Additionally, other factors such as the weak and corrupt political system in
Sierra Leone led to a weak health system in that country that was incapable of
containing the Ebola pandemic and thereby leading to its spread in Sierra Leone
(Anderson & Beresford 2016). Anderson and Beresford (2016) highlighted that
“Since the country’s devastating civil war of (1991–2002, Sierra Leone has become a
‘laboratory’ for liberal experiments in state building and governance” (p. 469).
Further, the health sector of Sierra Leone has always been dependent on external aid,
which has consequently compromised the government’s control over the sector
(Anderson & Beresford, 2016).
Davies and Rushton (2016), also raised very critical questions on medical
assistance to civilians by peacekeeping missions. They indicated that the reliance of
external partners such as peacekeeping missions to cushion failing national health
systems in countries such as Liberia was detrimental and one of the main reasons why
the country was unable to provide a workable national health system. However, the
crucial issue is, for a country that was coming out of over a decade of civil war,
external assistance in most spheres of public life including support in the medical
field was crucial to sustain the fragile structures which remained after the war.
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Significantly, it is noteworthy that in spite of the crucial roles that non-medical
emergency management agencies have to play in responding to the crisis, not much is
known about the capacity of such agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone before, during
and after the West Africa Ebola crisis of 2013/14.
Effect of Ebola on Socioeconomic Development of Liberia and Sierra Leone
The Ebola outbreak in West Africa was very rare, and almost totally
overturned developmental efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone after the civil wars that
ravaged those countries. (Oleribe et al., 2015) The epidemic had a considerably
negative impact on the socio-economic growth of the affected and negative impact
development impact was quite colossal. Ryan (2014), asserted that the severity of the
outbreak significantly disrupted the entire established fabric of Liberia, unsettling not
only the governance structure of but also the health system. Before the Ebola crisis,
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone had very good prospects for socio-economic
accomplishments, bearing in mind their enormous natural wealth and improving
macroeconomic projections (Sy & Copley, 2015). In Sierra Leone, as a result of the
Ebola outbreak, both exports and the capacity to generate revenue through taxes were
severely weakened due to the substantial decrease in economic activities (Dumbuya &
Nirupama, 2017).
According to Bappah (2015), "the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank projected that the immediate fiscal effects of the EVD outbreak were
US$113 million (5.1 percent of GDP) for Liberia, US$95 million (2.1% of GDP) for
Sierra Leone, and US$120 million (1.8%) for Guinea" (p. 192). The consequence of
the disaster also saw a sharp reduction of GDP growth rate of Liberia from the
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preliminary 8.7% through 5.9% and 2.5% to 1% (Ryan, 2014). Revised World Bank
estimates projected that more than $ 1.6 billion of productivity from the severely
impacted countries of the Ebola epidemic would be forgone in 2015 (Bowles et al.,
2016).
Because of the disease, countries which share common borders with the
infected countries closed their borders and limited movement of persons across
countries to avert a more spread of the disease (Sy & Copley 2015). The epidemic
seriously hampered agricultural production, a situation which did not only lead to
price uncertainties but also stifled sale of agricultural products in Liberia, Sierra
Leone and Guinea (Sy& Copley 2015). Public and private limitations on commerce
and travel did not only jeopardize the already poor economic situation of the infected
countries but also hindered efforts to control the disease (Moon et al., 2015).
Eventually, the crisis led to the most noteworthy setback to economic development in
Liberia and Sierra Leone in more than a decade (Bowles et al., 2016, p. 271).
Within Liberia, there was a significant reduction in economic activities and
jobs in entire country during the Ebola crisis, especially in the in Monrovia (Bowles et
al., 2016). In Monrovia, the construction and restaurant sectors witnessed significant
cuts in employment. The situation in Sierra Leone was not different as the crisis
forced several companies to cut down their operations, leaving just skeletal staff or
temporarily halting their operations to prevent their staff from being infected. This
state of affairs significantly obstructed revenue and GDP (Dumbuya & Nirupama,
2016). Consequently, there was a domino effect which impacted the service industry
such as hospitality and tourism.
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Additionally, some foreign-owned companies either completely shut down
their operations or operated at minimum capacity, causing a significant impact on the
economies of the affected countries. In Liberia, a Chinese company that was
undertaking a World Bank contract for the construction of a road that was to facilitate
trade between Liberia and Guinea, China Henan International Cooperation Group,
pulled out its workers, leaving the most significant infrastructural project in Liberia to
be redundant (Taylor, 2015). Similarly, the Chinese Civil Engineering Construction
Company sent its foremen and critical workers back to China and postponed all local
projects in Sierra Leone, because of the Ebola outbreak. The China Kingho Energy
Group also abandoned its premises and pulled out of Sierra Leone (Taylor, 2015)
According to Wilkinson and Leach (2015), at the peak of the Ebola crisis in
July 2015, London Mining, a London-based firm withdrew its expatriate staff from
the country. Also, British Airways and other airlines stopped all flights to the
country, a situation which further negatively impacted on trade. Apart from the
negative impact of the Ebola crisis on the economic activities of the natives and
revenue to the Governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone, the epidemic negatively hit
every sphere of the broader society of Liberia and Sierra Leone. At the peak of the
crisis, religious and other social activities were halted, schools were closed, and social
relations among people were significantly impaired.
It is important to underscore that despite the negative socio-economic impact
of the Ebola crisis on Liberia and Sierra Leone very little is known about the roles
non-emergency management agencies such as the Liberia National Disaster
Management Agency (NDMA) and the Sierra Leone Department of Disaster
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Management within the Office of National Security (ONS). A crucial question is
whether an intervention by or inclusion of these non-medical emergency management
agencies in the two countries would have averted the epidemic and thereby preserving
the socio-economic gains that had been made by both countries after many years of
brutal civil wars in those countries.
International Panic and Stigmatization of Africans
The Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2013 to 2015 invoked fear and panic
around the world which led to some governments either contemplating or taking
drastic measures to prevent a possible outbreak in their respective countries. Although
Africa is a continent of 54 countries, many Africans were sometimes lumped together
as coming from one country (Opar 2014). This generalization was done either from
out of panic and fear of infection or merely out of ignorance. Kissi (2014) highlighted
that, while some people stereotyped Africa and Africans as the quintessence of
sickness and argued that Ebola from the "dark Africa" poses a danger to "American
civilization", others contended that such reactions are reasonable public health
reactions to a lethal virus. In Kissi’s view such arguments make Ebola, Africa and
indeed all Africans synonymous. Such situations do not only create unnecessary fear
and panic around Africans but also reinforces the wrong impression and
stigmatization of the continent and its people as "backward" and "dangerous."
According to Monson (2017) Although the first patient of the 2014 Ebola
crisis was documented in March 2014, the media did not pay attention until late
summer 2014 when Dr. Kent Brantly, arrived in the United States for treatment after
contracting the virus. As a result, of Dr. Brantly’s arrival, the US media was saturated
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with headlines such as "Close to Home: First Case of Ebola Diagnosed in the U.S."
and "American Nurse with Protective Gear Gets Ebola: How Could This Happen" (p.
4). While 99% of Ebola infections were in Guinea, Libera and Sierra Leone, a few
travel related incidents to Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and the United States highlighted the
potential for the disease to spread by travelers from Africa, a situation which
dominated American media portrayals of the Ebola virus (Gronke, 2015).
Kim, (2014), described how some experts and volunteers who served in Liberia
during the crisis were stigmatized and subjected to some scientifically indefensible
quarantine policy in New Jersey and Maine when they returned to the United States.
Moon et al., (2015), held the view that response to the Ebola infections in the United
States was characterized by fear and hysteria which later resulted in
counterproductive measures including quarantines of aid workers who were returning,
a situation which significantly hindered the control of the epidemic. Several other
countries, companies, and organizations also imposed travel restrictions on their staff.
Due to lack of knowledge, several countries tried to use border controls to
prevent the "importation of the disease" into their respective territories. Gronke
(2015), summarized some of the countries that took drastic measures to use border
controls to avoid infections. Indeed, African countries such as Cameroun, Gambia,
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal stopped, or limited air travels form all
Ebola-infected countries (Gronke, 2015). South Africa refused entry to non-citizens,
and others on permanent residence status traveling from the infected countries
(Gronke, 2015). Other developed countries such as Australia, provisionally deferred
immigration and humanitarian programs to West Africans. In Costa Rica, authorities
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were on high alert because of large numbers of undocumented West Africans who
were en-route to the United States through the country to the extent that police
officers were warned not to touch any dead bodies under any situation including road
traffic accidents and crime scenes devoid of Ebola suspicion (Gronke, 2015). Just on
Ebola suspicion Albania detained and quarantined illegal Eritrean migrants who had
arrived there through Greece, with the intention of crossing the Adriatic Sea into Italy.
Even though the Ebola epidemic significantly affected only three out of 16
West African countries, to a large extent anyone traveling from any part of Africa to
other parts of the world was thought to be infected with Ebola virus. Also, because of
unnecessary fear that had been created, professionals who could go into the infected
countries to help respond to the crisis were scared to go. Kim (2014), posited that
even respectable people in society had contributed to the scaremongering and
advocated for travel bans.
It is interesting to note that in spite of all the fear and subsequent
stigmatization of everyone traveling from Africa to the rest of the world, for fear of
carrying the virus, Ghana accepted to host the Headquarters of the UN Mission for
Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) in Accra. This meant that responders had to
respond to and from Accra, however, not a single case of infection was and has ever
been reported in Ghana. The fact that there was no Ebola infection reported in Ghana
despite the movement of people to and from Liberia and Sierra Leone during the
epidemic, is an indication that many countries were unnecessarily afraid of infections.
However, what needed to be done was to put in credible measures to prevent possible
transmission of the virus, rather than stigmatizing travelers from Africa.
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Weaponization and Bioterrorism of Ebola Virus
In human history, adversaries in conflicts or wars have always found a way to
deal lethal blows to their opponents to defeat or annihilate them. In the early parts of
the twentieth century, efforts were made by countries to weaponize viral agents
(Pedersen, 2017). According to Chiodo, as referenced by Pedersen (2017), accounts
of warfare in the Middle Ages indicate that there was a use of combat weapons such
as spears and swords which were deliberately infected with bacterial agents. Pedersen
(2017) referenced Langmuir and Andrews who had stated that during the twentieth
century, the manufacturing of epidemics advanced to include the delivery of aerosol
pathogens or the contamination of water and food supplies. Some scholars have
indicated that there are legitimate concerns that the Ebola virus could be used by
extremists in a bioterrorism attack, (Passi et al., 2015; Maras & Miranda, 2016;
Malizia et al., 2016).
From the 1980s, extremists have gradually considered biological warfare
agents as a highly threatening tool for disruption of civil society and world economy
(Cenciarelli et al., 2015b). Maras and Miranda (2016), observed that in the 1990s
Aum Shinrikyo, the leader of a Japanese cult with the name Shoko Asahara, together
with many doctors moved to the then Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) under
the pretext of a medical assignment to study and to obtain samples of the deadly
Ebola virus. Although the cult was unsuccessful in creating biological weapons, it is
important to emphasize that the attempt by the group to even get samples of the virus
to weaponize it for mass destruction is an indication that both state and non-state
actors to do maximum damage to humanity could still use the virus.
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Ebola is a dangerous virus that does not only cause an extremely contagious
infection which is difficult to contain, but it may also be used deliberately to present a
serious threat as a possible biowarfare agent (Cenciarelli et al., 2015b). During the
Ebola Crisis in West Africa, the political class in the United States had suggested the
imposition of travel ban because of the fear that ISIS recruits could infect themselves
with Ebola to carry out bioterrorism (Kim, 2014).
Because terrorism is one of the main security threats of the twenty-first
century, the possibility of non-state actors attempting to weaponize the Ebola virus for
terrorist acts cannot be overemphasized. Passi et al. (2015), highlighted how the
Ebola virus spreads and surmised that due to the potential features of the Ebola virus,
it is a highly likely agent for bioterrorism. Considering that Ebola may be caused
naturally, Thiessen (2014), opined that with Ebola, “mother nature has created a
perfect weapon” (para. 6). Should Ebola and Islamic radicalism be combined into
one, the world will become a very dangerous place (Thiessen, 2014).
In Mcinnes (2016) view, from a traditional national security standpoint,
attention has rarely been fixated on the likelihood for a health crisis to lead to failure
of states which has far-reaching consequences for regional stability and international
security. Mcinnes (2016), further highlighted the possible use of pathogens such as
smallpox or anthrax as weapons of mass destruction, plus the probable use of
pathogens for bioterrorism.
Possible agents of attack are categorized by the dangers they pose, and these
categories range from A, B and C, with Category A being the most dangerous. Due to
its capability to create mass terror and commotion, coupled with the distinct public
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health activities required to treat infected people, Ebola is categorized as Category A.
(Pedersen, 2017; Cenciarelli et al., 2015b). In Pedersen's (2017) view, a genetically
invented virus can be more disastrous than atomic weapons. Gunaratne (2015),
surmised that despite scientific progress in medical virus surveillance if the Ebola
virus were intentionally introduced into a densely inhabited area, the consequence
would be catastrophic. As highlighted by Thiessen (2014), if terrorists collect
samples of infected body fluids and clandestinely place them at public places on
doorknobs, handrails etc. the disease will spread silently before authorities realize that
a biological attack has occurred. Thiessen (2014), further posited that the Ebola virus
was prevalent on the African continent where terrorist groups such as Boko Haram,
Ai-Qaeda and Islamic State are active. Considering the 21-day gestation period of the
virus, terrorist groups could get more than enough time to infect themselves and
others before they are detected.
Cenciarelli et al. (2015), however, hypothesized with two worst-case scenarios
where Ebola virus can be released, the choice of which would depend on the purpose
of the terrorist organization. The first scenario included an overt attack, and the
second, a stealthy attack. Regarding overt attack, Cenciarelli et al. (2015), posited that
using Ebola virus would be useless, apart from the fear and panic it will cause, since
such actions and infections would be prompted leading to isolation procedures by the
authorities. The detection and other procedures might lead to the blocking of the
spread of the virus and reduction in lethal cases. About a stealthy attach, Cenciarelli
et al. (2015), indicated that the strategy of deliberately and covertly infecting people
without anyone realizing would have a suspended effect through manipulation of the
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incubation period. This strategy has the potential to widely spread infections among
people with serious ramifications of mass murder. Due to the disastrous
consequences of the potential use of the Ebola virus as a weapon of mass destruction
by terrorist groups, the need for non-medical emergency managers to have a
contingency plan in place to deal with related safety and security issues cannot be
overemphasized.
National Response
When epidemics break out, the timeliness of rapid response is crucial to
prevent its spread. In the wake of the crisis, the most impacted countries made several
efforts to contain the situation, albeit such efforts have been criticized as lacking
efficiency. The Liberia and Sierra Leone, governments’ responses were prompted at
the peak of the outbreak and subsequently rolled out measures including the
imposition of state of emergency, and putting large areas under quarantine, to begin to
tackle the epidemic (Bowles et al., 2016; Wilkinson & Leach 2015). Additionally, the
respective government of Liberia and Sierra Leone put in other measures to contain
the epidemics.
Gbla (2018), emphasized that in Sierra Leone, the government harnessed all
its resources in an attempt to tackle the Ebola crisis. Operationally, the Government of
Sierra Leone responded to the crisis by creating and executing various agendas with
the view to effectively coordinating a response to the crisis. Between July and
September 2014, the Government of Sierra Leone established an Emergency
Operations Center (EOC) which was primarily used for the coordination of activities
(Olushayo et al., 2016). Then, from October 2014 till the end of the crisis in
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November 2015, the Government used a command and control fashioned Incident
Management System (IMS) referred to as the National Ebola Response Center
(NERC) to manage the epidemic (Olushayo et al., 2016). The initial national EOC
had the responsibility of coordinating the operational and technical aspects of the
response under five technical components, namely; “coordination;
epidemiology/surveillance/laboratory; case management/infection control; social
mobilization/psychosocial support; and logistics” (p. 2).
The EOC was mainly managed under the Ministry of Health and Sanitation
and was overseen by the Minister for Health or the Chief Medical Officer. The ONS,
an agency that is mandated to coordinate emergency management in the country and
most suitable for that role (Gbla, 2018), however, could have better managed this
oversight and coordination responsibility. As a result of the failure of the EOC, the
government established the NERC, which was more encompassing and included
several other actors including the Security Agencies. The Security Agencies such as
the Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) as well as
hybrid structures including chiefdom and district security committees, District Ebola
Response Committees (DERC), etc. joined efforts to manage the epidemic (Gbla,
2018).
The NERC was designed with a local government oversight through a chief
executive officer appointed by the President (Forestier et al., 2016). Unlike many
other places around the globe such as Nepal in 2015 and Haiti in 2010 where the local
governments were completely overwhelmed in their effort to coordinate relief and
response during the disasters in those countries, the case of Sierra Leone was
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completely different due to the effectiveness of the NERC and DERCs that were set
up by the Sierra Leone Government (Forestier et al., 2016). The situation room at the
NERC was replicated at the various DERCs with slight modification, depending on
the particular requirements of the district (Forestier et al., 2016). At both the NERC
and DERC levels, the military gave advisors and Chiefs of Staffs to effectively
coordinate response and assist the chief executive officer (Forestier et al., 2016).
According to UNICEF as referenced by Thomas et al. (2017), as the epidemic
escalated and began to spill out of control in Liberia, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
declared a state of emergency, shut schools, provisionally laid off less essential
government employees and closed the country's land borders. Also, the President,
with the support of the Center for Disease Control, created an Incident Management
System, under the oversight of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. She further
created a Presidential Advisory Committee on Ebola under her supervision as the
highest decision and policymaking body on the Ebola crisis response, with the view to
ensuring accountability and establishing a clear chain of command (Thomas et al.
2017),
Scholars have given how various institutions responded to the Ebola crisis in
West Africa, and reasons why these responses were effective or otherwise, in
containing the crisis (Shepler, 2017; Comfort et al., 2016; Olushayo et al., 2016). In
all the significantly impacted countries, the responses were ineffective due to factors
such as the scale of the outbreak, ineffective capacity for response and emergency
communication, ineffective coordination, poor health systems, and community
resistance (Olushayo et al., 2016). Liberia and Sierra Leone are among the least
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ranked countries in the global Human Development Index, ranked 176 and 183
respectively out of 187 countries, and as such, did not have the required systems in
place to deal with a mass outbreak of a disease (Wenham, 2016). Given the limited
resources of the respective Ministries of Health of the significantly impacted
countries, it was practically impossible for the Ministries to be able to effectively deal
with the threat of Ebola without assistance from the other actors and the international
community (Comfort et al., 2016).
Shepler (2017), ascribed corruption, mismanagement of funds and weakness
of the State as part of the factors that contributed to the spread of the disease. Shepler,
(2017), further highlighted that the virus was given a foothold when the Ministries of
Health of Liberia and Sierra Leone played down the threat at the beginning of the
crisis. In Liberia, because of constant accusations of corruption in President Sirleaf's
government, several Liberians even thought that the Ebola outbreak was a subterfuge
by corrupt officials to make money (Shepler 2017),
According to Wilkinson and Leach (2015), the problem of insufficient
resources in Sierra Leone was compounded by corruption. It is alleged that high-level
corruption resulted in donors suspending funds to the Ministry of Health and
Sanitation in 2013 (Wilkinson & Leach, 2015), Distrust and lack of confidence among
the citizenry also significantly impacted governments efforts to deal with the
catastrophe. Also, a rising lack of trust between the public and government officials
mired communal mobilization and civic education (Moon et al., 2015). In Sierra
Leone, people peddled rumors and gave various unsubstantiated reasons, targeting
various groups. Rumors such as US government using Ebola as bio-weapons,
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pharmaceutical companies testing new vaccines, politicians using Ebola to eliminate
the populations of the strongholds of their opponents were all peddled (Shepler,
2017). These made people lose confidence in the Sierra Leone Government’s fight
against the epidemic.
Significantly, it is important to underscore that the Governments of both Sierra
Leone and Liberia put is some measures at the peak of the crisis with the view to
ensuring an efficient response in their respective countries. However, it is worthy of
note that the roles of the Disaster Management Department of ONS for Sierra Leone
and the Liberia NDMA, the agencies which are charged with the primary
responsibility of coordinating national disaster response in these countries were not
clearly spelled out in the scheme of the respective Governments’ response efforts to
the crisis.
The Response of the International Community
The Ebola crisis was more complex than a typical health emergency. It was a
“multi-dimensional public and altruistic crisis which required a complex, multifaceted response involving health, aid coordination, personal security, food security,
appropriate budgetary decision-making, and responsive governance, among others"
(Ryan, 2014). Roemer-Mahler and Rushton (2016), contended that in spite of over
twenty years of significant investment in global health, the comprehensive response to
the Ebola outbreak in West Africa was sluggish and uncoordinated. Dubois et al.
(2015), observed that although the warning signs were there, the World Health
Organization failed to see the impending severity of the epidemic and therefore did
not respond early enough. Dubois et al. (2015), further posited that in spite of the
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warnings from agencies on the ground and persistent appeals for action, these calls
were disregarded. As a result, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) together with less
experienced agencies and astounded government services were left to address major
medical issues on their own without the needed support from the international
community. Dubois et al. (2015), therefore blamed the rapid spread of the disease on
the failure of both national and international actors to respond quickly to the outbreak.
Ifediora and Aning (2017), conversely, argued that the remarkable international
response to the EVD outbreak eventually contributed significantly to the stopping of
the spread of the disease in West Africa.
According to Taylor (2015), at the peak of the pandemic, China announced
that it was sending $5 million worth of medical supplies to the affected countries (p.
50). The Ebola situation was the first time China had extended humanitarian support
to nations ravaged by public health emergency. It is important to underscore that
while other countries were withdrawing their staff from the impacted countries, China
sent three teams of infectious diseases experts to the affected countries (Taylor 2015),
According to OCHA as referenced by Thomas (2016), by the end of 2014, over 62
countries had promised and dedicated US$2.3 billion to the Ebola response in West
Africa, including US$806 million specifically for Liberia. The United States
Government announced a US$319 million response plan; the World Bank announced
US$105 million in funding for West Africa. The United Nations also outlined nearly
US$1 billion in funding needs (Thomas, 2016),
According to Bappah (2015), The Economic Community of West Africa
States (ECOWAS) played a significant role by mobilizing funds and sending health
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experts to its member countries that were affected by the Ebola crisis. However, the
roles played by other well-endowed organizations such as the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the United Nations (UN) agencies, largely overshadowed
the efforts of ECOWAS.
Regarding the United Nations, in September 2014, the global body declared
the EVD as a threat to international peace and security. The UN went further to
establish the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), with the
objective to stop the outbreak, treat the infected, ensure essential services, preserve
stability, and prevent further outbreaks (Ifediora & Aning 2017). Davies, and Rushton
(2016), nevertheless, argued that the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) that
was already in place before the outbreak of the epidemic could have done more to
contain the EVD. Davies and Rushton (2016), however, conceded that many factors
such as the views of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), the competencies of the
mission as well as actions of the host government among others inhibited the ability
of UNMIL's contribution. It is important to point out the fact that UNMIL and many
other UN Peacekeeping missions have generic responsibility of safeguarding security
of civilians and humanitarian actors. However, peacekeeping missions (UNMIL
included) are usually not necessarily well equipped with skilled personnel and
resources to deal with a medical epidemic with the magnitude of the Ebola crisis.
In spite of some of the positive roles played by the international community in
dealing with the epidemic, scholars believe there are a lot of lessons to be learned
from the global response if future pandemics are to be managed efficiently (Bappah,
2015; Ifediora & Aning 2017). Bappah (2015), argued that some of the mistakes
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made by ECOWAS included the dependence on weak and poor health institutions in
the affected countries as well as the failure of the ECOWAS leadership to realize that
the health personnel in the affected member states were strained and therefore
required additional hands rather than money. Further, it was evident that the
ECOWAS inter-governmental decision-making process was unnecessarily long in
responding to emergencies. Bappah (2015), however, drew plausible lessons learned
from the crisis. It was identified that ECOWAS needed to improve on its regional
emergency response strategy. Bappah (2015), also highlighted the importance of the
need to accelerate decision making during emergencies and finally suggested the
reliance on a competent health emergency response mechanism to deal with future
regional pandemics vibrantly. Ifediora and Aning (2017), were also of the view that
among other issues, “internationalization of risks and threats will have little effect if
regional arrangements lack adequate capacity to fulfill their roles within the global
collective security architecture” (p. 237).
Involvement of Military from Britain and United States
United States Troops in Liberia
At the peak of the crisis, countries such as the United States and Britain supported the
response effort with military contingents in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively
(Smernoff, 2013; Anderson & Beresford, 2016; Thomas et al., 2017). According to
the White House Press Secretary, as referenced by Thomas et al. (2016), as the crisis
continued to raise significant security concerns in West Africa, President Obama
committed the whole US government to end the Ebola outbreak. Later, the President
announced US$319 million for the response, making the West African Ebola crisis a
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National Security Priority. The United States strategy encompassed the deployment of
up to 3,000 military personnel to build 17 Ebola Treatment Units with 1700 beds and
provide logistical support to West Africa as part of Operation United Assistance
(Thomas et al.,2016; Adler et al., 2018).
As part of the effort of the US in responding to the epidemic, US troops were
sent to West Africa to support a cross-section of activities. These activities included
constructing mobile and fixed lab capacity and capability to diagnosing EVD, training
indigenous nationals in the appropriate application of personal protective equipment
(PPE), erecting Ebola Treatment Units, delivering logistic support, and safeguarding
security (Sipos et al., 2018). According to Nevin and Anderson (2016), the
preliminary response began with the U.S. Africa Command stating their arrival at the
Roberts International Airport (RIA) on 18 September 2014 with seven soldiers and a
single forklift. A few days afterward, 45 personnel arrived in Liberia, set up a
command headquarters, and were joined by 100 more personnel by 25 September.
Later, on 30 September, the Pentagon announced significant plans of deploying 1400
troops in October and by October 3, deployment instructions had been issued for an
additional deployment of up to 3,200 personnel (Nevin & Anderson, 2016).
In spite of the positive impact, the US deployment of troops may have made in
combating the EVD in Liberia, Kim (2014), attempted to impugn what in his view
was a double standard approach of the United States in dealing with more important
global issues such as the EVD. Kim (2014), argued that Secretary of State, John Kerry
had rallied a global coalition for a mission of “utmost urgency” to battle the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which according to Kerry was a cancer, a disease that
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every civilized country should be responsible enough to stamp out before it spreads.
According to Kim (2014), however, regarding a real disease, the United States had
delayed the much needed response even after the disease had killed up to about 1,552
people by the time Kerry was still soliciting global coalition to fight ISIS.
It must be understood that although the Ebola epidemic of 2014 in West
Africa posed a considerable threat to not only West Africa, but also the entire Africa
and indeed the rest of the world. In my view it is incongruous to compare the United
States response to the Ebola epidemic, and the soliciting a global coalition against
ISIS. It is important to point out the fact that countries have their threat profiles and
priorities in their foreign policies and their attempts to take leadership roles in global
affairs. Such priorities may dictate a country’s priorities in responding to different
security threat scenarios. Arguably, it would have been appropriate if the United
States’ response to the Ebola epidemic had been swifter. However, to compare the
response of the Ebola epidemic to a global response to ISIS reduces the importance of
response to epidemics by world leaders into a different arena of global politics.
British Troops in Sierra Leone
In Sierra Leone, as the crisis became more complex and difficult to handle,
The UK Ministry of Defense, and later other friendly countries including Canada and
Ireland committed troops in support of DFID assistance programs (Forestier et al.,
2016). According to Reece et al. (2017), The British military played very important
roles in shaping the UK's Ebola response in Sierra Leone. The British Military set up
the military Ebola Treatment Centre (ETC), at Kerry Town about 31 km from
Freetown, the first in-country facility, devoted to the treatment of both international
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and local medical professionals. The facility was staffed and supported by several
nurses, medical and operational personnel from both the British National Health
Services and the military. The military also provided both military and civilian
personnel involved in the Ebola response with force protection measures to mitigate
the Ebola Disease risk involved in the operation (Forestier et al., 2016).
Further, the Royal Engineers assisted and advised on the construction of
ETCs. The Royal Navy ship RFA Argus also provided logistical support and offshore
treatment for non-Ebola related sicknesses (Reece et al., 2017). The Navy further
provided support for the transportation of medical equipment and supplies to Sierra
Leone. The military response to the Ebola crisis in both Liberia and Sierra Leone may
be seen as among the major contributory factors in successfully bringing the EVD
under control. Sandvik (2015), however, argued that considering the deployment of
military personnel, strategies and tactics as the main reason for success is prejudiced,
because it does not only degrade the spirit of the nationals of Ebola affected countries,
but also the efforts of local health workers and other humanitarians to control the
outbreak. Sandvik (2015), further emphasized that when such humanitarian crisis are
described as ‘national security’ issues as was the case of the 2014 epidemic before
the deployment of the military, it is easier to conceal evidence from the public,
thereby, making it extremely difficult to assess the actual effectiveness of the
response.
It is clear that in spite of the roles played by both the United States and British
militaries in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively, it is not known if part of the
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efforts or resources of these militaries were channeled to assist the non-medical
emergency management agencies to coordinate the response to the Ebola crisis.
Summary
The purpose of chapter two was to critically examine the significant issues
relating to the Ebola outbreak in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In this chapter, the
researcher briefly highlighted some literature on the theoretical framework for the
study, and after that, delved deeper into the real issues about the Ebola outbreak in
Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2014 - 2015, with the view to finding gaps in the
literature as a basis for this study. The key themes that were identified in the available
literature includes history of the Ebola virus; the socio-political factors that led to
rapid spread of the virus; the failure of system in Liberia and Sierra Leone that
contributed to the spread of the disease; and the effect the outbreak had on the socioeconomic development of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Other thematic areas that were
identified in the available literature included the international panic and stigmatization
of Africans because of the outbreak in West Africa; and the potential for the Ebola
virus to be weaponization for bioterrorism. The reviewed literature also covered the
response of governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone to the crisis, the response of the
international community and then the involvement of the military from Britain and
the United States.
After the review, the researcher realized that not much was known about the
roles played by the non-medical emergency management agencies such as NDMA
and The Disaster Management Department of ONS of the Republic of Sierra Leone,
the agencies that have the primary responsibility of coordinating emergency
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management in the respective countries. Further, the researcher observed that a gap
remains in the available literature on the roles that may have been played by
emergency management agencies in the West African region in support of the
international community’s efforts in responding to the crisis in Liberia and Sierra
Leone. The researcher filled this gap in knowledge by describing and documenting
the specific roles played and should have been played by non-medical emergency
management agencies of Liberia and Sierra Leone, and such agencies in West African
countries in responding to the 2014 Ebola epidemic.
Chapter 3 focused on the research methods and procedures that were used to
answer the questions to the gaps raised in the available literature. The chapter further
gives clarity on the respondents to the research question, delves deeper into the issues
of ethics and gives details of the data collection and analysis. Chapter 3 set the stage
for the research to be conducted, leading to discussions on the finding, and subsequent
recommendations in Chapters 4 and 5.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
In this study, the researcher explored the roles EMA play in managing
epidemics that afflict countries and transcend national boundaries. The purpose was to
enquire about the role nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone played in
managing the Ebola crisis of 2014, and if no significant roles were played, what roles
such agencies should have played in managing this crisis. Chapter 3 includes research
questions, research method, and methodology information. The researcher also
highlights procedures for recruitment of participants for the study and how data were
collected and analyzed. The chapter also highlights issues of trustworthiness. The
researcher also discussed ethical issues and protection of participants as well as the
role of the researcher.
Research Design and Rationale
Research Questions
RQ1: What roles did nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone play
when responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis?
RQ2: What roles should nonmedical EMAs of Liberia and Sierra Leone and
similar agencies in West Africa have played when responding to the 2014 Ebola
crisis?
Research Tradition
According to Creswell (2014), research methodologies are approaches and
processes for research that involve broad assumptions, painstaking methods, and the
collection of data and subsequent analysis. The research method also refers to the
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overall plan that a scholar chooses to incorporate various parts of the study in a
comprehensible and analytical way, to ensure that the research problem is adequately
addressed. Yin (2014) identified three main research methods: qualitative,
quantitative, and mixed research methods. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
(2008) defined qualitative research as “a form of social inquiry that focuses on the
way people interpret and make sense of their experiences and the world in which they
live” (para. 4). Qualitative research fundamentally deals with witnessing a
phenomenon from the viewpoint of the people being studied.
According to Lambert and Lambert (2012), different approaches to qualitative
studies include phenomenology, grounded theory, and ethnography. In addition to the
traditional and well know qualitative methods, other scholars have also identified
generic qualitative inquiry as suitable for dissertations (Kennedy, 2016; Percy et al.,
2015). Percy et al. (2015) said “generic qualitative inquiry investigates people's
reports of their subjective opinions, attitudes, beliefs, or reflections on their
experiences, of things in the outer world” (p. 78). According to Kennedy (2016), the
generic qualitative inquiry does not involve committing to a specific methodology or
philosophical viewpoint.
For this generic qualitative inquiry, the researcher used the pragmatic
descriptive approach to describe the experiences of EM experts in Liberia and Sierra
Leone who witnessed the Ebola crisis that ravaged the Mano River region of West
Africa. In addition to EM experts from Liberia and Sierra Leone, the research also
described the skills of EM experts from the Ghana NADMO and subject matter
experts from the KAIPTC
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Justification for Choice of Qualitative Method
According to Marshal (1996), the choice of a research methodology should
not necessarily be an issue of preference of the researcher but should be determined
by the research questions. Percy et al. (2016) emphasized that sometimes when the
more traditional qualitative approaches such as ethnography, case study, grounded
theory, and phenomenology are not suitable for one reason or the other, scholars
should consider a more generic qualitative inquiry approach. Percy et al. (2016) said
that “though phenomenologists explore people’s opinions, beliefs and feelings among
others; the phenomenologist’s curiosity is in the inner dimension, qualities, and
structures (essences) of those cognitive processes, but not in the external content that
may trigger the cognitive processes” (p. 77). It is significant to emphasize that this
study seeks to investigate the external professional opinions and views of respondents
in answering the research questions and not necessarily their lived and internal
psychological experiences during the Ebola crisis. Consequently, the generic
qualitative inquiry offers the best approach for the study.
Additionally, a generic qualitative inquiry is suitable because it is aligned with
the research problem, purpose statement, and research questions. This research
methodology also offered the researcher the opportunity to collect pertinent data to be
able to understand the opinions and feelings of EMs who endured the Ebola crisis in
Liberia and Sierra Leone and how, in their view, the crisis should have been managed
from a nonmedical expertise point of view. Regarding sampling and data collection,
the purposeful sampling method was used. Only a targeted group of EM professionals
participated.
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Role of the Researcher
According to Simon (n.d.), in a qualitative study, the researcher is seen as the
instrument to collect data. Data collection is therefore facilitated mainly through the
researcher. Creswell (2014) posited that in the course of data collection, the
researcher is responsible for “setting the boundaries for the study, collecting
information through unstructured or semi-structured observations and interviews,
documents, and visual materials, as well as establishing the protocol for recording
information” (p. 189). The researcher’s responsibility in this study included the
collection of data through interviews with EM experts, transcribing, coding and
subjecting the evidence to analysis to arrive at credible findings and conclusions.
According to Greenbank, as cited by Simon (n.d.), the qualitative researcher
should describe relevant aspects of self, including any prejudices, assumptions,
expectations, and experiences that qualify his or her ability to conduct the research.
The researcher worked in Liberia during the peak of the Ebola crisis of 2014. During
the period, the researcher expected the lead EMAs in Liberia to take a lead role in
managing the epidemic. However, the researcher did not see much of the roles played
by the NDMA of Liberia. This observation may prejudice the researcher’s views
about the findings of the research.
Research Methodology
Logic of Participant Selection
Although many other professionals experienced the Ebola crisis in Liberia and
Sierra Leone, this study employed stratified purposeful sampling and targeted only
specialists in emergency management. Participants included a total of 12 emergency
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management professionals in Liberia NDMA, Sierra Leone ONS, Ghana NADMO
and a subject expert from the KAIPTC in Accra, Ghana. The researcher reached
saturation after interviewing three participants each from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
Ghana. The researcher ensured that the interviewees cut across the agencies earlier
indicated in the three countries, to ensure that the findings of the research will be
quality, transferable and representative of the West African region.
Criteria for Selection of Participants
The primary criterion for selecting participants in Liberia and Sierra Leone
was the presence of participants in these countries during the Ebola Crisis of 2014.
There was a possibility that new subject matter experts may have joined the
emergency management agencies of Liberia and Sierra Leone after the epidemic.
Such people may not necessarily have lived through the crisis as emergency
management experts and as such may not have the real experience that this research
seeks to unravel to answer the research questions.
The criteria that was used to select participants in Ghana was, being an
emergency management expert from the NADMO, with experience or training in
managing epidemics, or being a subject matter expert from the KAIPTC. These
criteria ensured that the questions on emergency response capacities in the West
African sub-region were adequately answered.
Sampling Methods
Marshall (1996) acknowledged three main methods in the careful choice of a
sample for qualitative research. These include convenience sample, judgment sample
and theoretical sample. For this study, the researcher used judgment sampling, also
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known as purposeful sampling. Marshall (1996), opined that the appropriate size of a
sample for a qualitative study is one that effectively answers the research question.
According to Crossman (2017), purposive or judgment sampling is a non-probability
tester that is carefully chosen due to special characteristics of a population and the
purpose of the study. Purposive sampling is typically employed when the scholar
needs to speedily reach a targeted sample, or when the focus of the study is not
focused on sampling for proportionality.
Critical case sampling which is a type of purposive sampling will be used in
this study. Critical case sampling is used when the researcher chooses a case for study
because it is expected that studying it will reveal insights that can be applied to other
cases. As a result, the researcher considered critical case purposive sampling as most
ideal for this study as the sample size will be non- probability and was focused on just
a beset group of emergency management experts in Liberia and Sierra Leone and
Ghana.
Data Collection
This generic qualitative inquiry typically used data collection techniques that
elicit participants' reports, views and ideas about how emergency management
agencies should have handled the Ebola crisis of 2014 but not how “internally” they
individually felt about the crisis. The research relied mainly on face-to-face and
telephone interviews with management experts from Liberia NDMA, Sierra Leone
ONS, Ghana NADMO and subject experts from the KAIPTC in Accra Ghana.
According to Wyse (2014), employing face-to-face interviews in research ensures
improved screening of participants. For instance, the individual being interviewed
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cannot provide false information during screening questions such as gender, age, or
race (para 2). When face-to-face interviews are used to collect data, the emotions and
behaviors of the interviewee can be adequately captured. Although face-to-face
interviews was the most appropriate data collection method for this study, the
researcher also used telephone interviews with some of the respondents due to the
inability of the researcher to travel to Liberia and Sierra Leone.
To ensure that data was captured accurately, the researcher had an assistant
who helped during the interviews to also record all that transpired during the sessions.
The researcher also record all sessions, with voice recorders to ensure that all
comments were properly captured. After each interview session, the researcher
playback the recorded version to the interviewees to ascertain if they wanted any
portions of what they have said changed. This gave the interviewees the opportunity
to correct their comments and ensure the accuracy of the data collected. The
researcher also rely on data from media reports, videos and other internet resources on
the 2014 Ebola epidemic.
Data Analysis Plan
Thematic analysis offers a method of data analysis that is malleable and well
suited for many research approaches. According to Percy et al. (2016), there are three
types of thematic analysis, namely inductive, theoretical and thematic analyses with
constant comparison. This research employed the inductive method to analyze the
data. Percy et al. (2016), posited that inductive analysis requires the researcher to set
aside all pre-understandings of the issues before the analysis begins. It further requires
that data collected from each be analyzed individually. Percy et al. (2016), provided a
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systematic approach to conducting inductive analysis. This approach which the
researcher used is explained below.
The researcher took time to peruse and acquaint himself with all data collected
from each respondent, and intuitively, highlight any sentences, phrases or paragraphs
that appeared significant. After that, the researcher reviewed all the highlighted and
used the research questions to decide if the highlighted information was related and
relevant to the research questions. Subsequently, the researcher eliminated all
highlighted data that were unrelated to the research questions and stored that data in a
separate file. Then the researcher did a simple coding of the data with serial numbers
and pseudonyms to be able to keep track of individual information in the data.
Further, all items of the data that were related or connected were clustered to
develop a pattern. Each pattern was described in a phrase that sums it up. As patterns
begin to emerge, the researcher identified items of the data that corresponded with the
specific pattern. These patterns were placed in the previously assembled cluster that
manifests that pattern. Furthermore, the researcher took all the patterns and looked
for predominant themes. This process included combining and clustering the related
patterns into themes. After all the data had been analyzed themes arranged and paired
with their corresponding supporting patterns on a matrix. Codes or descriptors for
each of the data clusters were included in the matrix for further analysis. For each
theme, the researcher wrote a detailed abstract analysis, describing the scope and
substance of each theme. The process was repeated for data from each participant.
After that, the researcher combined the analysis of data for all participants including
patterns and themes that were consistent across the participants' data.
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Trustworthiness Issues
Burkholder et al. (2016), elucidated that trustworthiness is the qualitative term
usually used instead of validity for quantitative studies (Kindle Locations 2153-2154).
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), trustworthiness is the degree of confidence a
researcher can have in the findings of a study. Trustworthiness in a qualitative study
is about establishing, credibility; transferability dependability and confirmability to
ascertain the truth and accuracy of the research findings.
Credibility
Lincoln and Guba (1985), specified methods such as prolonged engagement,
persistent observation, triangulation, peer debriefing and thick description in
establishing the credibility of research. Burkholder et al. (2016), also, theorized that
in a qualitative study, the researcher does not need to use all the strategies related to
credibility but instead choose the plan or strategy most suitable for the study (Kindle
Locations 2249 - 2251). For this research, triangulation was used to establish the
credibility of the findings. Creswell (2014), suggested that data should be collected
from numerous sources to include interviews, observations and document analysis.
For this study, the researcher used different types of methods such as gathering data
through interviews. The researcher also relied on media publications and document
analysis of other available data from open sources. The researcher also cross-verified
information from different sources to ensure that the research findings are reliable,
cogent and credible.
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Transferability
Transferability refers to the researcher's demonstration of how the findings of
the research can be applicable in other contexts. The findings of this study would
apply to other scenarios of the management of epidemics by non-medical emergency
management agencies around the globe. In DeVault’s (2017) view, purposive
sampling can be used to address the issue of transferability since explicit data is
exploited in relation to the context in which the data collection occurs. The sampling
method employed by this study is purposive sampling, and that should make the
findings of this research transferable.
Dependability
Dependability is the extent to which the research findings can be replicated
with consistency by other researchers based on the information from this study given
the same resources used for this research. To this end, participants were given the
opportunity to review the analysis of their responses to ascertain that their thoughts
and responses were accurately captured and properly analyzed. Other researchers and
subject area experts from the KAIPTC were relied upon to confirm or corroborate the
research findings.
Confirmability
Confirmability refers to the extent to which the results could be confirmed or
corroborated by others. One method of establishing confirmability is ensuring an
efficient audit of the entire research process to ensure that the research findings
accurately conforms to the responses of the interviewees. While this may not be
established and spelled out in this research, the committee chair and other committee
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members assigned to this study ensured efficient auditing of the process to ascertain
the process used to arrive at the research findings.
It is noteworthy that confirmability also refers to the degree of neutrality of the
researcher concerning the findings of the study. Bearing in mind the researcher’s
potential bias and preconceived thoughts, the researcher remained a passive
participant during the interviews; the researcher only asked questions and allowed the
respondents to do more of the talking while he recorded. The researcher only asked
questions to clarify areas that required clarity.
Ethical Issues
At all stages of the research process, scholars are faced with ethical challenges
ranging from who to be selected to be interviewed through the approach to be used in
collecting data to what information to include or exclude in the research. If ethical
standards of research are not adhered to, the researcher risks endangering the privacy
of his/her respondents and exposing them to harm. According to Ravitch (2016), the
privacy of an individual is linked with discretion and “entails decisions about how and
what data related to participants will be disseminated” (Kindle Location 7325). A
researcher, therefore, has a vital responsibility of ensuring the protection, the privacy,
and confidentiality of respondents of a study. Considering that data will be derived
from emergency management experts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, whose agencies
probably should have done more in containing the epidemic, there will be the
requirement to protect their privacy and keep them anonymous in the research since
that could jeopardize their careers.
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To ensure that respondents participate in a voluntary manner, the researcher
asked all participants to sign an informed consent form and informed participants that
at any point in the process, they were free to withdraw their participation. Participants
were also informed of the purpose of the research and made to understand that the
interviews were being recorded. Pseudonyms and nicknames of participants were
used throughout the study to further ensure confidentiality of participants.
Further, to avoid making serious ethical mistakes in this study, the researcher
sought clearance and direction from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Walden
throughout the research process. Most importantly, IRB approval was sought before
participants were recruited for subsequent data collection and analysis.
In the course of the study, the researcher, as a staff of the United Nations,
consulted the United Nations Ethics Office to be able to interview UN personnel who
played critical roles in responding to the Ebola epidemic in Liberia. The Ethics
Office, however, discouraged the researcher and raised an issue of potential conflict
of interest. The researcher complied with the Ethics Office’s advice and only relied on
open source information concerning the roles of the United Nations in managing the
crisis. Therefore, although the researcher remains a staff of the United Nations, the
discussions, findings and recommendations of this study should not be misconstrued
as a position of the Organization but merely a personal academic work.
Summary
This chapter described and justified the research methodology, how research
participants were recruited, data collection and analysis methods, ethical issues and
how they are addressed, as well as issues of trustworthiness relating to the research
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findings. Having exhausted the key areas and the general methodology to be
employed in the conduct of the study, this chapter set the stage for Chapter 4, the
study and results, and subsequently Chapter 5, summary, conclusions and
recommendations.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to learn about the roles played by
nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone in response to the Ebola crisis of 2014
at the national level. The study also explained roles played by such similar agencies in
West Africa when managing this epidemic. Chapter 4 presents data analysis and
findings involving the two main research questions:
RQ1: What roles did nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone play
when responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis?
RQ2: What roles should nonmedical EMAs of Liberia and Sierra Leone and
similar agencies in West Africa have played when responding to the 2014 Ebola
crisis?
Initially, RQ1 targeted respondents from Liberia and Sierra Leone, whereas
participants from Ghana only answered RQ2. Six interview questions were
considered for each of the research questions. However, in the course of the data
collection, all respondents were asked interview questions for both RQ1 and RQ2.
For RQ1, the interview questions involved participants’ experience in crisis
response to an epidemic such as the Ebola crisis. The researcher also sought to find
any strategies that participants thought their agencies should have used in responding
to the crisis, and which other agencies participants thought should have played key
roles in the response.
For RQ2, the interview questions involved respondents’ agencies during the
Ebola crisis and the strategies that were used. The researcher also sought to find any
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plausible strategies that were not used but could have been used by EMAs. The
researcher further wanted to know if any other EMA in West Africa assisted in the
Ebola response, how the response of participants’ agencies helped in dealing with the
Ebola crisis, and how ECOWAS’ response helped in dealing with the crisis. In this
chapter, the researcher explains the setting for the research, demographics, data
collection, and data analysis. Subsequently, evidence of trustworthiness is discussed
along with results and a summary.
Setting
The researcher used purposeful sampling in identifying potential participants.
Following IRB approval, the KAIPTC nominated and introduced the researcher to 19
EM experts across Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana, all of whom the researcher
contacted through WhatsApp. Out of the 19, 12 indicated their willingness to
participate in the study. They sent the researcher their email addresses through
WhatsApp, after which the researcher sent consent forms to them through email. The
researcher collected data through face-to-face interviews with four participants in
Ghana and telephone interviews with seven participants in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
KAIPTC made a conference room available to the researcher where all face-to-face
interviews and six telephone interviews were conducted. Two telephone interviews
were done from the researcher’s car. All interviews were conducted at a convenient
time for participants, and the researcher ensured that confidentiality was guaranteed.
Participation in the study was voluntary, and the researcher ensured that there were no
undue pressures on participants to influence their participation.
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Demographics
Out of the 19 experts that were contacted, 12 indicated their willingness to
participate in the study. Although specific demographic information was not
collected, all participants were adults and above 18 years of age. Eleven of the
participants were EM experts who worked in the EMAs of their respective countries
during the Ebola crisis of 2014. All participants from Liberia and Sierra Leone
practiced as experts in their countries during the crisis. The four participants from
Ghana, however, did not practice in Liberia nor Sierra Leone, but were involved in
Ebola preparedness and ready for a response should there have been any case of
Ebola in Ghana. One of the participants was a subject matter expert and course
director at KAIPTC, the institution that has been at the forefront of training EM
experts in West Africa before and after the 2014 Ebola crisis. Consequently, diverse
opinions research questions contributed significantly to the findings of the study.
Table 1 indicates the demographic breakdown of the participants.
Table 1
Participant Demographics

Participants

Pseudonym Gender

Emergency
Management
Expertise

Country

Participant 1

Akosa

Assistant Director
of the Disaster
Management
Department

Sierra
Leone

Male
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Participant 2

Adwoa

Female

Research Officer
Disaster
Management
Department

Sierra
Leone

Participant 3

Kuku

Male

Deputy Director of
Disaster Risk
Management
Department

Sierra
Leone

Participant 4

Mpiani

Male

Disaster
Management
Logistics Officer

Sierra
Leone

Participant 5

Kwarteng

Male

Assistant Director
Serious Organised
Crime
Coordination
Department

Sierra
Leone

Participant 6

Yeboah

Male

Assistant
Coordinator
Emergency
Response Logistics
and Recovery

Liberia

Participant 7

Dwomoh

Male

Manager for Risk
and Early Warning

Liberia

Participant 8

Takyiwa

Female

Coordinator for
training

Liberia

Participant 9

Dada

Male

Course Director of
Disaster
Management

Ghana

Participant 10

Appiah

Male

Director Migration

Ghana

Participant 11

Nyantakyi

Male

Director Geological Ghana
Nuclear and
Radiological
Disasters
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Participant 12

Birago

Female

Director Disease
Epidemics/ Pests
and Insect
Infestations
Disasters

Ghana

(Table continues)
Note.
* For reasons of confidentiality, pseudonyms are used instead of the actual names of
respondents.
* Listing of participants is not necessarily according to the chronology of when they
were interviewed
Data Collection
Data were collected from 12 emergency management experts within 2 months
across three countries, using a semi-structured interview method. Each interview took
approximately 50 minutes or less. At the beginning of each interview, the researcher
briefly discussed the consent form and asked if participants were comfortable being
part of the study, before seeking their final consent. The researcher also informed all
participants that the interview was being audio recorded and reassured participants of
the full confidentiality of the process. The researcher emphasized that participation
was voluntary, and participants were free to cease to be part of the process at any
point if they lost interest in the study and wish to stop participating. Data were mainly
collected through face-to-face and phone interviews. In three of the face-to-face
interviews, and two telephone interviews, the researcher had a Walden Doctoral
student as a research assistant who helped with the data collection.
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Table 2
Data Collection Method
Participants

Face-to-

Telephone

Email

Location

Face

Akosa

X

KAIPTC

Adwoa

X

Researcher’s Car

Mpiani

X

Researcher’s Car

Kwarteng

X

KAIPTC

Takyiwa

X

KAIPTC

Yeboah

X

Researcher’s
Residence

Dwomoh

X

Researcher’s Car

Birago

X

Participant’s
Residence

Dada

X

KAIPTC

Appiah

X

KAIPTC

Nyantakyi

X

KAIPTC

Kuku

X

Data Analysis
In this generic qualitative inquiry, the researcher used the inductive thematic
analysis approach. According to Percy et al. (2015), the inductive analysis is driven
by information and it discourages the fitting of data into any pre-existing categories.
Thomas (2003) posited that the fundamental purpose of the inductive analysis
methodology is to enable a study’s results to develop from the common, dominant, or
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major themes enclosed in raw data, without the limitations imposed by structured
approaches (p. 2). According to Percy et al., (2015), the inductive analysis method
requires that the researcher sets aside all foreknowledge of the issue being
investigated before the analysis begins. Data gathered from each respondent such as
interviews and open-ended questionnaire among others are analyzed exclusively.
After subjecting the data collected from each individual to thorough analysis, the
repeating patterns and themes from all individual data are synthesized together into a
combined synthesis with the view to understanding the implications of the themes in
relation to the research question.
Percy et al. (2015), outlined the following 12 important steps to follow when
using inductive analysis:
1. Review and familiarize yourself with the data collected from each
participant (interviews, journals, field notes, records and documents).
Read the documents and highlight intuitively any sentences, phrases, or
paragraphs that appear to be meaningful. During this process the
researcher immerses him/herself in each participant’s data individually.
2. Review the highlighted data and use your research question to
decide if the highlighted data are related to your question. Some
information in the transcript may be interesting, but not relate to your
question.
3. Eliminate all highlighted data that are not related to your question.
However, start a separate file to store unrelated data. You may want to
come back and reevaluate these data in the future.
4. Take each piece of data and code it. The code can be very simple,
like a serial number or an address – simply a way to keep track of
individual items of data.
5. Cluster the items of data that are related or connected in some way
and start to develop patterns. For each distinct pattern you discern,
describe it in a phrase or statement that sums it up. If feasible or useful,
assign a second level code to the patterns too. Note that the words
describing the patterns are no longer the words of the participants, but
your own. In field-specific research (e.g., psychology), attempt to make
these words meaningful to specialists in the field (e.g., psychologists).
6. As you start to see patterns, identify items of data that correspond to
that specific pattern. Place them in the previously assembled clusters
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(see 5) that manifest that pattern. Direct quotes taken from these data
(transcribed interviews, field notes, documents, etc.) will elucidate the
pattern. (The name or descriptor of your pattern thus is a more abstract
phrase, whereas the data themselves are direct words from
participants.)
7. Take all the patterns and look for the emergence of overarching
themes. Themes are “patterns of patterns.” This process involves
combining and clustering the related patterns into themes. As you see
meaningful themes across patterns, assign a yet-more-abstract
descriptor to the theme. Use standard psychological language and
terms. This will be a third level of abstraction, supported by the
patterns, in turn illustrated by the direct data.
8. After all the data have been analyzed, arrange the themes in a kind
of matrix with their corresponding supportive patterns. (The patterns
are used to elucidate the themes, just as the word data are used to
support and illustrate the pattern descriptors). In the matrix, include the
codes or descriptors for each of the data clusters. Thus, the supporting
layers of words/text can easily be accessed when discussing an
individual theme in your final report.
9. For each theme, write a detailed abstract analysis describing the
scope and substance of each theme.
10. (Complete this process for each participants’ data)
11. Then combine the analysis of data for all participants including
patterns and themes that are consistent across the participants’ data.
12. Finally, the themes are synthesized together to form composite
synthesis of the data collected regarding the question under inquiry.
(pp. 80 – 81)

The researcher used the thematic inductive analysis approach provided by
Percy et al, (2015) to analyze all the data collected. As suggested in the thematic
inductive analysis approach, the researcher engrossed himself in each individual data
collected from participants. The researcher subsequently highlighted all relevant
phrases, sentences, and paragraphs that were relevant to the research questions. Then
the less relevant data were deleted and saved separately. The relevant data were then
put on an excel sheet for critical scrutiny and coding. The researcher grouped all the
data that were related and developed categories from the individual data. The
researcher then subjected the categories to further analysis for emerging themes. For
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each theme derived from each respondent, the researcher wrote a brief abstract of
what the participant meant, with direct quotations from the interview.
The process was repeated for all 12 respondents. Subsequently, the researcher
moved all the themes and written abstract of each respondent on a single spreadsheet
for a more detailed analysis to synthesize what all the respondents said, to answer the
research questions. Nine themes emerged from the transcribed data. These included;
coordination, communication, the inclusion of traditional and religious leaders; the
whole society approach; and control of the movement of people and cultural practices.
Other themes included autonomy, planning; border control; and ECOWAS.
The researcher further used NVivo software to assist in the generation of
frequently used words that emerged from the data collected from all respondents (see
Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Word cloud obtained from data analysis using NVivo.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Burkholder et al. (2016), said that trustworthiness is the qualitative term
usually used instead of validity for quantitative studies. According to Lincoln and
Guba (1985), trustworthiness is the degree of confidence a researcher can have in the
findings of a study. In this generic qualitative inquiry study, trustworthiness was
established through credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability to
ascertain the truth and accuracy of the research findings.
Credibility
Lincoln and Guba (1985), specified methods such as prolonged engagement,
persistent observation, triangulation, peer debriefing, and thick description in
establishing the credibility of the research. Burkholder et al. (2016), said that in a
qualitative study, the researcher does not need to use all the strategies related to
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credibility but instead choose the plan or strategy most suitable for the study. For this
research, the researcher used triangulation to establish the credibility of the findings.
Creswell (2014) suggested that data should be collected from numerous sources to
include interviews, observations, and document analysis. For this study, the
researcher interviewed different emergency management experts from across three
different countries. Saturation was reached after interviewing three respondents each
from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana. The researcher also relied on official opensource documents from emergency management agencies as well as media reports to
triangulate the data collected from respondents. The researcher also cross-verified
information from among respondents during the member checking process to ensure
that various respondents held similar views on the data. These processes ensured that
the research findings are reliable, compelling, and credible.
Transferability
Transferability refers to the researcher's demonstration of how the findings of
the research can be applied in other contexts. The findings of this study would apply
to other scenarios of the management of epidemics by non-medical emergency
management agencies around the globe. According to DeVault (2017), purposive
sampling can be used to address the issue of transferability since explicit data is
exploited concerning the context in which the data collection occurs. The researcher
used a purposive sampling method and targeted only emergency management experts
who played key roles in their respective countries during the Ebola crisis of 2014 in
West Africa. The professional views and opinions from these experts make the
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findings of this study transferable to the management of epidemics by non-medical
emergency management agencies elsewhere across the globe.
Dependability
Dependability is the extent to which the research findings can be replicated
with consistency by other researchers based on the information from this study, given
the same resources used for this research. To this end, the researcher ensured that
participants were given the opportunity to review the analysis of their responses to
ensure that their thoughts were accurately captured through transcript review. This is
an indication that if another researcher contacts the same participants and asks the
same questions, the researcher is likely to get the same or very similar responses from
the respondents. Further, the researcher also ensured the dependability of the findings
by abiding by all the data analysis tenets of generic qualitative inquiry. As a result, if
another researcher has the same resources and uses the same approach, that researcher
is likely to arrive at the same findings as that for this study.
Confirmability
Confirmability refers to the extent to which the results could be confirmed or
corroborated by others. One method of establishing confirmability is ensuring an
efficient audit of the entire research process to ensure that the research findings
accurately conforms to the responses of the interviewees. While this may not be
established and spelled out in this research, the researcher’s committee chair and other
committee members ensured efficient auditing of the process to ascertain the process
used to arrive at the research findings.
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It is noteworthy that confirmability also refers to the degree of neutrality of the
researcher concerning the findings of the study. Bearing in mind his potential bias and
preconceived thoughts, the researcher remained a passive participant during the
interviews. The researcher only asked questions and allowed the respondents to do
more of the talking while the researcher recorded. The researcher only asked
questions to clarify areas that required clarity. Further, the researcher approached the
data analysis with an open mind and cleared himself of all foreknowledge of the
Ebola crisis, to ensure that there were absolutely no biases in the data analysis.
Results
In this section, the researcher presents the findings of the study after a
thorough analysis of all the data collected. As indicated in earlier sections, data was
collected from 12 emergency management experts from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
Ghana through face-to-face and telephone interviews. The interviews were guided by
six questions for each of the two main research questions. The themes, which
emerged from RQ1 included coordination, communication, and inclusion of
traditional and religious leaders. Other themes were the whole society approach and
control of the movement of people and cultural practices. Themes that emerged from
RQ2 were autonomy, planning, border control, and ECOWAS. In this section, the
researcher presents a discussion and a descriptive narrative of the themes under the
two main research questions with direct quotations from the respondents.
RQ1
RQ1: What roles did nonmedical EMAs of Liberia and Sierra Leone play
when responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis?
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Five main themes were identified. These were coordination, communication,
and inclusion of traditional and religious leaders, whole society approach, and control
of the movement of people and cultural practices.
Theme 1: Coordination
Coordination remained a dominant theme that runs through the data from
many of the respondents across the three countries where the data was collected. Most
of the respondents alluded to the fact that the central and key roles that were played
by the emergency management agencies were coordination. Agreeably, coordination
remains the central role of emergency management agencies during a crisis. Although
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the emergency management agencies functioned as
departments under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the ONS respectively, these
departments somehow played coordination roles during the response to the Ebola
epidemic of 2014.
Akosa gave a brief legal backing to the constitutionally mandated role of the
ONS in coordinating crisis in Liberia. According to him, “the ONS is the statutory
body for the coordination and management of disasters whether manmade or natural
as provided for by the National Security and Central Intelligence Act 2002.”
Coordination became even more crucial in Sierra Leone when it was realized that the
Ministry of Health could no longer deal with the crisis. The ONS later took a
leadership role in the coordination efforts with its structures in the provinces.
According to Akosa, "ONS coordinators were in all the 14 administrative districts of
the country. ONS had coordinators deployed in all districts. These coordinators were
very instrumental in the coordination and management of the Ebola outbreak. Some
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of them were visible and provided strong leadership, while others did not. Pujehun is
a case of where the coordinator there provided astute leadership."
Adwoa emphasized the crucial coordination role, which was played by the
ONS. She indicated that the ONS brought together all key stakeholders and
coordinated their activities. She stated that the ONS had coordination meetings with
key government stakeholder agencies and ministries to respond to the crisis
appropriately. She noted, “We held out meeting, the National Security Council
(NSC), National Communication Coordination Group (NSCCG), and it involved all
the setup. It involved the Republic of Sierra Leone Army (RSLAP), the Sierra Leone
Police (SLP) Sierra Leone Fire Force and Correctional Center, Immigration, and all
the rest of them.” Adwoa also indicated that the ONS coordinated the response
activities of the international governmental and non-governmental agencies. She said,
"we moved with partners (both national and international partners), with the WHO,
MSF, UNICEF, among others. UNICEF was providing water and sanitation and
dealing with children. They have to save the children, we have the street child, a lot of
international organizations, and we have the UNDP, WFP, a host of them. We called
them all to coordination meetings."
Mpiani buttressed the fact that the ONS played a key leadership role in the
coordination of the response to the crisis. He indicated, "At the district and provincial
levels, the ONS, together with other local and international partners, provided
leadership of the district Ebola response centers and the command centers where we
established the coordination of the Ebola response. So basically, this is the roles we
played in the Ebola response."

82
Kwarteng rather emphasized the important strategic coordination role the ONS
played. He averred that the ONS provided strategic coordination advice to the
Government to declare a state of emergency. He noted that “So basically what we did
as a security agency, as a non-medical emergency agency, was to provide
coordination and strategic advice to the government of Sierra Leone to first declare a
national health emergency."
In Liberia, all the respondents emphasized the important coordination roles
that the emergency management agency played. Takyiwa highlighted that the NDMA
has the sole responsibility of coordinating the response of all emergencies in the
country. However, during the crisis, that role was limited. She stated, "We have the
sole responsibility of being the coordinators of any national emergency, but at the
time of the crisis, the role played was more limited. We served as the co-chair of the
national task force that was set up by the President."
Theme 2: Communication
According to some of the participants, during the crisis, the uninformed public
churned out several misleading information. It was after the emergency management
agencies of the respective countries intervened and changed the message that the rate
of infections began to go down. Adwoa indicated that messages were repackaged and
directed to the people in a bid to educate the public on preventive measures. She
noted, “We came out with short messages like wash your hand, wash your hand every
day and don't shake hands with people." According to Adwoa, most of the people in
Sierra Leone were of the view that the main symptom of Ebola was blood oozing
from the patient. However, in her view, people needed to be tested as soon as they

83
saw any sign of bad health, and sick people did not have to wait until they saw blood
before they are tested. To buttress her point, Adwoa stated: "We had to tell the people
that it was not only blood that you will see that you can say is Ebola, but you also
need to be tested."
Further, the general belief among the populace was that when people are
infected, and they go to the holding center, they will die. This misinformation kept
many infected people who could have received proper care away from the holding
centers, a situation that led to the death of many. Adwoa indicated, "Whenever
somebody is affected, people will say when you go to the holding center, you will die.
Therefore, the ONS sent people there. People were saying when you get the virus;
you will be vomiting blood. Therefore, when people are not vomiting blood, they
think they are okay. So, it was the ONS that change the narrative for people to be
encouraged to seek care at the holding centers and prevent further spread of the
virus".
Kwarteng shared a similar opinion that the ONS had to correct some wrong
information that was in the public domain. He indicated, "There was this kind of
distortion of information that was flowing into the public domain that there was no
Ebola, like the moment you contact Ebola you are dead. A lot of people the moment
they feel sick instead of calling to seek services, they were wasting away, and so we
ensured that communication became a key concept. Messages were sent through
videos, using radio, nontraditional methods, traditional methods, and everyone was on
board to get the population to understand why they needed to seek help when they fell
sick.”

84
Mpiani highlighted that one of the key roles the ONS played was providing
information on safe practices. He averred that "the role my agency played was to
provide information on safe practices such as public gathering, washing of the dead,
burying of the dead, the activities of traditional healers, the selling and eating of
bushmeat, strike action for health workers, communities that were resisting burial of
Ebola victims among others".
In Liberia, the situation was similar. At the beginning of the crisis, the public
was misinformed into believing that as soon as a person gets the Ebola virus, he or
she will die. This misinformation rather kept people living in denial even when they
had contracted the virus. According to Takyiwa, "the messages that were being sent
out at the beginning of the Ebola response were not messages that were clear
enough." According to her, "such messages as if you have a virus, you will die. If you
are exposed to the virus, you will die. If you come in contact with someone who has
the virus, you will die the messages that scared people away" At the later stages, the
NDRC intervened and changed the wrong message. Takyiwa said, "at the latter part
of it, the messages were revised. Revised in a sense, when you come in contact with
the virus or come in contact with somebody who has the virus, and you report
yourself to the health worker or a health facility or a nearby center, you have a
possibility, or there is a possibility you will not die."
Yeboah emphasized on how the NDRC used strategic communication to
reduce the rate of infections. He indicated that initially, the message that was churned
out was that people would die if they touched anyone with the Ebola virus. Yeboah
stated, "The first messaging was if someone has the Ebola, if anyone touches the
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person, that person gets infected and died" However, later, the NDRC intervened and
changed the message. Yeboah further indicated that the message was later changed.
He said, "later the messaging had to be redesigned to say look if you just wear the
plastic hand or the PPE and touch stuff or infected people, that person will survive it
does not mean you will die. So you see that was the role of the NDRC under the
ministry of internal affairs then."
Dwomoh buttressed the fact that the message out in public was
counterproductive to the efforts being made to solve the Ebola crisis in Liberia. The
wrong message led to people escaping from the treatment centers and unknowingly
infecting people. Dwomoh stated that the "NDRC had to go and re-coin the message
because the message "when you attract the virus you die" was also resulting in people
escaping from treatment centers, and then the transmission was increasing. So, when
we changed the message, the new message now became you contract the virus and
seek early treatment, there is a possibility for survival."
Respondents from Ghana rather emphasized the importance of communication
in dealing with epidemics. Birago indicated that the NADMO engaged other
stakeholders such as the Ghana Education Service (GES) and the Ministry of Health
to educate and inform the public on the Ebola virus to prevent any spread of the virus
had entered Ghana. Birago stated, “When it comes to awareness, building and
creating awareness and sensitizing the public, we had GES taking care of the schools.
Now we had Ministry of Communication and information, coming in to play the role
of public education, you know creating that public awareness, all right, making sure
that the airwaves were saturated and actively engaged in offering education as far as
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Ebola prevention and preparedness was concerned. Also, as far as anything that had to
do with Ebola education was concerned, NADMO engaged the Ministry of Education,
Ministry of Communication, to play that integral role."
Appiah indicated that in Ghana, NADMO was used in strategic
communication to sensitize the public about the Ebola Virus. He stated, "we were
given more of a role of community sensitization, information sharing, and so on
because aside from everything, NADMO is much diversified. We have staff all the
way to the communities. Therefore, they thought that it was easy for us to reach the
various communities to disseminate information. So we were more into
communication strategies to reach out to the public."
Theme 3: Inclusion of Traditional and Religious Leaders
The respective disaster management agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone
employed a strategy to include leaders in the societies to respond positively to the
Ebola crisis. This strategy contributed significantly to reducing the rate of infections
in both countries. Some of the respondents indicated that the inclusion of traditional
leaders was done later. However, it significantly led to bringing the crisis under
control
According to Kwarteng, “At the initial stage, we didn’t have the traditional
authorities fully involved. We should have done that at the very beginning, especially
when the crisis emanated from the remotest part of the country, we should have had
the buy-in and active involvement of the local chiefs at that level. However, we later
included them in the response, and when we did, the people felt a part of the response
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effort, especially when the communities saw their traditional leaders getting
involved."
In Dwomoh’s opinion, the traditional authorities should have been included
from the very onset of the crisis to avoid more deaths. He stated that “what we did
was to recruit from the National Traditional Council. We brought chiefs and elders in,
provided them pieces of training and adequate information on the treatment of the
virus and mode of transmission, and why there was, need to suspend traditional
cultural practices. Dwomoh stressed that though this strategy comes in a bit late, it
helped reduce the rate of infections and deaths significantly. Dwomoh noted, "What I
think we should have done differently was to get the traditional and religious people
involved in the crisis response from the onset. It was later we got them involved by
then we had lost thousands of people.
Birago shared the same opinion that the inclusion of traditional authorities in
response to epidemics is extremely important in awareness creation. She noted,
"Actively engaging community-based authority, traditional authorities, and leadership
within our communities to create awareness and mobilize community support for
Ebola preparedness was crucial. Something that we need to continue to build on
because any crisis starts within the community, so we need to build capacity within
our communities to be able to respond to any crisis. She recollected that this approach
helped significantly in the response. Birago further indicated, “If my mind serves me
right, I think one thing we tried doing was engaging our traditional authorities to
support Ebola awareness creation. As part of this sensitization and awareness
creation, we actively involved the traditional authorities and community leaders
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within our country. I think that was one thing which was very instrumental. Learning
lessons from Sierra Leone and Liberia, we knew that, but for the timely intervention
of these people, these particularly identified people within our communities, it would
have been worse than what we ever saw."
Takyiwa mentioned that traditional authorities were included in the response
as a strategy to get the community on board to help reduce the rate of infections and
deaths. She indicated, we also had involvement of the chiefs, the town
superintendents, and District Commissioners all involved in the Ebola response
process.
Yeboah saw the involvement of the traditional authorities as a plausible
strategy in responding to the crisis, due to the power the traditional authorities and
town chiefs wield in the communities. Yeboah saw the best way to deal with the rate
of infections was to get the traditional leaders involved to communicate with their
people to stop such practices that were detrimental to the health and lives of the
people during the Ebola crisis. Yeboah noted, “One of the strategies we used was to
inform the traditional chiefs in responding to Ebola because in Liberia the traditional
chiefs hold a very important role. In Liberia, when someone dies before burying of
bodies, then they go to bathe the body, then go and have rituals, these practices
needed to be stopped during the Ebola crisis." The traditional leaders helped in
stopping these practices to prevent further spread of the virus.
Theme 4: Whole Society Approach
Some of the respondents indicated that one of the plausible strategies that the
emergency management agencies employed in combatting the Ebola crisis was the
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wholes society approach. It is essential to underscore the fact that during a crisis,
getting the whole society involved in dealing with the crisis help significantly in the
response. Takyiwa noted, "I think now disaster management we have something
called the Whole of Society Approach, I think that that was not done in the beginning.
However, later in the response, we engaged the business community, school
administrators, the local leaders, all to form a part of the Ebola response." According
to Yeboah, it was necessary to engage all segments of the society at the national and
regional levels by engaging all stakeholders, including teachers, opinion leaders, other
religious bodies, and the churches. This was necessary because the churches and
religious bodies were involved in praying for the dead, and they needed to modify
their procedures to prevent further spread of the virus."
From Birago’s perspective, “In Ghana, an all-inclusive approach in dealing
with an epidemic such as the Ebola crisis is absolutely necessary to be able to control
possible infections and subsequent spread. Birago mentioned that "so in terms of
strategy, it is a holistic kind of approach making sure that every sector or every level
of our society was actively involved and engaged in making sure that we were able to
prevent the Ebola crisis in Ghana. Therefore, it was a holistic approach from national
to regional as well as within our settings into community levels to prevent infections.
Birago further indicated that the multi-sectoral approach had been a key strategy in
Ghana in dealing with various forms of disasters. She mentioned that "That is our
strategy — multi-sectoral approach in responding to emergencies in this country. We
always have a lead technical agency, but other sectors come to support. We need to
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strengthen that system, before, during, and after the crisis, and then we learn lessons,
and we build upon it. And so that cycle goes on."
Theme 5: Control of Movement of People and Cultural Practices
In responding to epidemics such as the Ebola crisis of 2014, it becomes
imperative to control the movement of people to prevent and to reduce the spread of
the virus. In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, emergency management agencies,
through the sector ministries under which they operated at the time of the crisis,
ensuring that the movement of individuals who were suspected to be infected with the
virus was restricted and confined. According to Akosa, "method that was adopted by
the response team to contain further spread of the virus was to quarantine people
suspected to have come into contact with an infected person. Persons suspected of
coming into contact with an infected person were quarantined in holding centers."
Additionally, movement of the wider population was restricted to ensure that
the infections of the virus was contained and restricted. The security agencies were
brought in by the emergency management agencies through the respective sector
ministries to ensure this strategy. According to Akosa, people's movements were
restricted, so there were checkpoints created in several places in the country, and we
also have security personnel again managing the streets" Adwoa indicated that there
was total Lockdown of some communities to prevent the spread, According to her
“we invoked something we call Lockdown. During Lockdown, nobody moves out,
but the ONS will make passes for people, stakeholders who might work during the
Lockdown. For instance, during the lockdown, the Ministry of Health will be allowed
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to play its medical role by bringing their nurses that will go from house to house to
check people."
Further, public gatherings were prohibited in Sierra Leone during the crisis.
According to Akosa, “The ONS ensured that consistently kept our eyes on public
gatherings and ensured where ever there were public gatherings. The ONS tried to
bring to book whosoever was organizing public gatherings. The ONS had staff and
district coordinators in all the districts. All the districts had command centers, and our
personnel was part of that arrangement.”
To halt the spread of the Ebola virus, the emergency management agencies did
not only have to restrict the movement of people but also significantly alter the
cultural and religious practices of the citizens. Burial of the dead and its associated
cultural practices were altered. According to Akosa, “During the Ebola outbreak,
there was a moratorium that people should not carry out burials, but they must alert
the burial team. So such breaches of burials were reported to the Ebola response
center for quick action. The ONS was responsible for dealing with such breaches.”
In Liberia, it was customary for the dead to be bathed before burial, a practice
that increased the spread of the virus. Both Muslims and Christians practiced this
custom. According to Yeboah, due to the harmful nature of this custom, the NDRC
under the Ministry of Internal Affairs went out and called all the churches and
religious bodies to stop burying their dead through traditional means." A system of
cremation, which was viewed as a safer practice, was introduced. According to
Dwomoh, "A system of cremation was introduced, so instead of burial, we were
cremating bodies. This strategy did not go down well with a lot of people in the
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country, and there was a plan to demonstrate during the outbreak. Therefore, when we
got that information, we decided to go back from cremation to dignified burial
practice, so we would allow families to come and to witness the burial ceremonies of
their loved ones but under the rightful eye of the greater community involved in
burials.”
RQ2
RQ2: What roles should the non-medical emergency management agencies of
Liberia and Sierra Leone and similar agencies in West Africa have played in
responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis?
Four main themes emerged in answering RQ2. These were autonomy,
planning, border control, and ECOWAS.
Theme 6: Autonomy
Prior to and during the Ebola crisis of 2014 in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it was
evident that there were no independent emergency management agencies in Liberia
and Sierra Leone. All the participants from Liberia and Sierra Leone indicated that the
mandated emergency management agencies were in existence but under a government
ministry. In Liberia, the emergency management agency existed under the name
NDRC, which was under the Ministry of Interior. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, the
emergency management agency existed and still exists as a department under the
ONS. Most of the participants indicated that the lack of autonomy significantly
affected the competence of the emergency management agencies in carrying out their
mandated tasks.

93
Akosa elucidated that disaster management agency, as an entity, exists only as
a department within the ONS under the National Security and Central Intelligent Act
of 2002. In spite of that issue, when the crisis began in Sierra Leone, the legally
mandated institution, the ONS, was not used; instead, the government created another
body to manage the crisis." He stated, "During the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone,
there was a constitutional boycott as the government then did not use the statutory
body but rather created an ad-hoc body referred to as the National Ebola Response
Centre (NERC)." In Akosa’s opinion, “if there were an autonomous emergency
management agency with a clearly defined mandate, and left to operate independently
at the time of the crisis, the agency would have done a more professional job in the
initial response.”
Takyiwa, for instance, indicated that “if there was this autonomy that there
was an agency for crisis and disaster management in Sierra Leone, the health people
would not have just gone ahead to think that they were in charge. The agency would
have just come in swiftly at the initial stages and coordinate everything to save lives.
However, because they did not know what to do at that time, they could not put the
situation under control, people were just dying. If we had an autonomous agency, the
situation would have been under control.”
Mpiani shared a similar view and indicated, "Well, during the whole Ebola
process, the ONS has a constitutional mandate, under the National Security and
Central Intelligence Act, but during the Ebola crisis, it was different. It was torn apart.
They rather set another body, which was the National Ebola Center (NAC), which
was not constitutional, to play the role and attain leadership. If we had an autonomous
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emergency management body, our roles would have been better played when the
crisis happened”
Kwarteng was also of the opinion that if there was an autonomous emergency
management agency in Sierra Leone, the Ebola crisis would have been better dealt
with. He opined that "we do not have an autonomous agency. What we have is a
Department for Disaster Management within the ONS. It is just a department. If we
had an autonomous agency, our response to the crisis would have been more effective
at the initial stages because we would have had the funds, we would have had the
human resource capacity. Because if people are now into that department, everyone
within the department will be trained adequately in the area of responding and
managing disaster issues. But as it is, just a unit of four people, five people within the
department is a difficult thing."
Kuku emphasized, “The National Security and Central Intelligence Act 2002,
mandates the ONS as the National Coordinator of all forms of emergency, either manmade or natural.” According to him, “during the crisis, after the President of the
country has declared a state of emergency, the ONS coordinates all forms of
emergency, using strategic leadership through the Strategic Situation Group (SSG)
Command. The ONS also the National Situation Room, where all information
pertaining to the emergency is filtered on a daily basis. The ONS also analyzes such
information in consultation with other Ministries and Departments. The ONS
thereafter briefs the President on the incident and make recommendations to lessen
the effect of the threat.”
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For Liberia, the respondents expressed the same sentiments that the current
NDMA was not in existence at the time of the crisis. Rather, there was NDRC under
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. All the respondents alluded to the fact that if an
autonomous NDMA were in existence at the time of the crisis, the response would
have been more effective and properly coordinated. Takyiwa, for instance, indicated
that “During the Ebola crisis it was not an agency. It was not an autonomous body. It
was referred to as the National Disaster Relief Commission, NDRC, and that relief
commission had an office under the Ministry of Interior. Therefore, at that time, it
was not an agency. We played a role, but it was not the exact role, as the agency, as
an autonomous body, should play, but we played a role during the Ebola outbreak. So
whatever role we played was being played through the Minister of Internal Affairs
who is now the current chair of the board of Directors of the NDMA."
Yeboah also buttressed the fact that the NDMA was not in existence at the
time of the crisis. According to him, "in 2014, NDMA had not been legally
established as an agency. What we had before was the NDRC under the Ministry of
Internal Affairs. It was a department under the Ministry of Internal affairs, and it was
actually the NDRC who was then in place at the Ebola crisis under the Ministry of
Internal Affairs." Yeboah was further of the view that having an autonomous disaster
management agency in Liberia prior to the crisis would have been crucial in the initial
national response. He indicated that "because we were not an autonomous agency,
other stakeholders usually dealt with the Ministry of Internal Affairs rather than
dealing directly with us. This state of affairs significantly hampered our response
capabilities."
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Dwomoh highlighted that the National Disaster Management Act was only
passed in 2016. He gave a historical perspective that prior to that, there had been an
Executive Order in 1976 by the then-president to establish the NDRC. According to
Dwomoh, “the National Disaster Management Act was not passed at the time of the
Ebola crisis; the Act was passed in 2016, which officially established the NDMA. But
then there was Executive Order by then President of Liberia in 1976 establishing the
NDRC to deal with dire situations at then. This commission existed under the
Department of Operation at the Ministry of Internal Affairs.” He also indicated,
“when the Ebola crisis broke out in 2014 the President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf recommission the NDRC to lead on the Ebola crisis.” In his view, if there had been an
autonomous emergency management agency with the sole role of coordinating all
disaster response in Liberia before the crisis, the experts in that agency could have
acted more independently to appropriately respond to the crisis before it could get out
of hand. To buttress this point, Dwomoh indicated, "according to the law, the disaster
agency is responsible for coordinating all disaster-related activities in the country."
Theme 7: Planning
Some of the respondents indicated that prior to the crisis, there were no
emergency response plans in place is not only Liberia and Sierra Leone, but also in
other countries in West Africa. Most of the respondents shared the view that if
emergency management agencies had very comprehensive plans in place before the
Ebola epidemic, the crisis could have been better managed to save lives. In Sierra
Leone, there were no plans in place to deal with the epidemic because no one thought
about Ebola. This state of affairs led to confusion at the beginning of the crisis.
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Akosa noted, "Nobody knew we were going to have Ebola, so we did not plan on how
we were going to respond to it. In fact, from the beginning, there was a lot of
confusion as to what to do, what to manage, and what not to manage. At the time the
Ebola broke out, there was no comprehensive plans and policies to respond to it."
Kwarteng indicated that due to a lack of planning when the crisis began, it was not
taken as seriously as it should have. Kwarteng noted, "The structures and plans were
not in place to respond to the crisis of that nature mainly due to the fact that disease
was affecting the country for the very first time. We had heard of Ebola in remote
places as the case may be, and there were a whole lot of challenges around even the
reality of the disease. Therefore, at some level, it was not treated with the seriousness
it deserved.”
In Liberia, however, there was a National Influenza Plan in place prior to the crisis,
but it was only in a draft form. This plan was developed after the crisis began.
Takyiwa intimated that “we had a draft National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
and Response Plan. So, the first thing that we did was to develop an Ebola
Preparedness and Response Plan out of the draft document that we had.” Yeboah was
of the view that "Prior to the crisis, what my agency should have done was to plan.
We needed to plan for any kind of disaster management response. We should have
planned. We should have done a whole pandemic plan and who responds to what in
case of emergency, but we failed to do so" Dwomoh buttressed the fact that after the
crisis, the NDMA should have immediately developed a pandemic plan to deal with
future occurrences. He stressed, “There was no response plan in place prior to the
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crisis. So after the crisis, we should have gone to prepare an epidemic response plan,
and that should have been an immediate step after the outbreak by the NDMA."
Joint planning among West African Countries for epidemics is very crucial in
responding to such epidemics that transcend the boundaries of countries. Birago
stressed the importance of such planning by emergency management agencies in West
Africa due to the fact that no such joint plans exist even after the Ebola crisis. Birago
mentioned that "So until we get these things right, where we are meeting regularly,
we are networking and we are training together, trust me, we will not be able to
respond appropriately to epidemics like the Ebola crisis. For now, my strong antidote
to a crisis is that we should be able to work before, we need to have that working
relationship with all the technical agencies, in the respective countries, do our plans
together, do training together, have memorandum of understanding, begin to look at
the resources that we need and advocate strongly for it. These are preparedness. Once
we get this right, the response will be easy."
Appiah was emphatic that there were no plans in place in Liberia and Sierra
Leone prior to the crisis. In his view, it would have been appropriate if other
emergency management agencies had rallied to support these countries to plan and
respond to the crisis. Appiah noted that "Liberia and Sierra Leon did not have any
disaster management plans. When the Ebola started and was simmering, we could just
have gone out there to help them to develop a plan, a very simple plan to manage the
situation, but we stayed away."
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Theme 8: Border Control
Managing the border with other countries is very crucial in controlling
epidemics such as Ebola Virus Disease, which transcend international boundaries. It
is crucial that once there is an outbreak in a neighboring country, other countries
coordinate and collaborate to control the movement of people across borders to
prevent further spread of the disease. It is imperative that when epidemics break out,
the authorities coordinate and quarantine the epicenter to avoid further spread. In
West Africa, when the disease broke out in Guinea, the authorities in Liberia and
Sierra Leone were slow in coordinating and controlling the movement of people
among these countries. This situation led to the spread of the disease from Guinea to
Sierra Leone and Liberia. According to Akosa, “The borders between Sierra Leone
and Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia are very porous, and for that reason, efforts
should have been made to coordinate with the other countries to control the
movement of people to prevent a spread of the disease at the very beginning of the
crisis. Akosa further indicated that the Kailahun District, where the disease was first
recorded in Sierra Leone, should have been quarantined as soon as the first EVD case
was recorded. He noted "Kailahun District borders with Guinea and Liberia. The very
first positive case of the Ebola virus in Sierra Leone was recorded in that district. Lots
of lives and resources would have been saved had the disease been contained in that
district by quarantining the few people who had been exposed to the positive case.
The district wasn't quarantined that led to the spread of the virus to other districts."
From Adowa’s perspective, in March, a passenger came in; you know, we
have this border between Sierra Leone and Guinea, where people do the exchange of
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goods they come to buy. So, we had this woman who came to the midwife having the
virus, and after treating her, the virus stated in Sierra Leone. I think as soon as there
was an outbreak in Guinea, we should have moved quickly to control our border with
Guinea and Liberia to prevent a possible spread to Sierra Leone" Mpiani shared a
similar opinion and indicated "Prior to the crisis, we should have controlled our
border movement. Our border is so porous. According to the information we got, it
was a woman who visited her uncle, later went to a funeral, got the disease, and later
passed it on to everybody. So prior to that, we should have had in place washing of
hands and checking people that come in and go out of the country."
Kwarteng emphasized on the fact that the emergency management agencies
and authorities did not act fast enough to prevent the spread of the disease from
neighboring countries. Kwarteng mentioned, “I think also the Ebola did not just come
to Sierra Leone all of a sudden, it came from neighboring countries, Liberia and
Guinea. We did not engage our counterpart. We should have engaged them from the
onset and control our borders to prevent a spread into Sierra Leone. We waited left
our borders open, porous, considering the nature of the socio-economic relationship
between Sierra Leoneans and Guineans and even Liberia; we could have been alerted
to know that once this thing happening in Liberia, there is 90 to 99% chance that it
will happen in Sierra Leone."
In Liberia, Yeboah was of the opinion that "once there was an outbreak in the
neighboring countries, the National Repatriation Commission should have worked
with the NDRC and Ministry of Health to prevent unnecessary movement of people to
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prevent a spread of the virus. However, that important role was not taken seriously
and was rather left for foreigners.
Theme 9: ECOWAS
Some of the respondents indicated that disaster management Agencies from
sister West African countries did not directly move into Liberia and Sierra Leone
during the crisis. The situation was mainly due to the very high infections and fatality
rate of the Ebola virus. Adwoa indicated that no emergency management agency
from West African Country directly moves into Sierra Leone to support during the
crisis. However, after the epidemic, some emergency management experts moved in
to offer their assistance. She stated, "They didn't come at that time, but after the
whole crisis, they were coming from Ghana, Nigeria, and all that." Mpiani indicated
that sister West African countries supported the response but from afar. He indicated,
"Well, they were supporting us. Because it was possible for them to be infected, so
they supported us with materials and other equipment." He clarified that "We have the
ECOWAS management team that is responsible for epidemics and disasters. We had
a consultation with them, and they supported us. They helped us financially and with
other materials.”
Takyiwa, however, indicated emphatically that, to the best of her knowledge,
she "did not see another disaster management agency from other West African
countries coming to Liberia to support the ministry, during the crisis." Yeboah also
indicated ardently that no emergency management agencies from any other country
came to Liberia to support during the crisis. He stated emphatically, "as far as I
remember, no emergency management agencies came into Liberia to support during
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the crisis, probably due to the fear of the possibility of being infected by the virus."
From Dwomoh’s perspective, no emergency management agency from West Africa
moved to Liberia to support it. However, at the initial stages, Liberia sent emergency
management experts to Sierra Leone to support the response in that country. He
noted, "Actually, no agency from West Africa came into Liberia. There was a point in
time we had to dispatch professionals to Sierra Leone to support their response."
Nyantakyi was also emphatic that “Ghana did not send emergency management
experts to any of the affected countries. I also think no country in West Africa sent
emergency management experts to affected countries."
Birago also buttressed the fact that no emergency management agencies were
dispatched to Liberia and Sierra Leone to support in response to the crisis. She
emphasized, "ECOWAS response was a far cry from which should be expected
because it’s like nobody paid attention to the countries that were facing the Ebola
crisis. It was all because of the fear of the unknown. Not so much was known about
EBOLA, and everybody was afraid as it was killing, so nobody came out to support
the affected countries."
According to Dada, ECOWAS was caught unawares by the crisis in 2014.
Several of the countries in ECOWAS During the outbreak in 2014 were unprepared
for such an epidemic. He indicated, “The whole West Africa sub-region was caught
unawares. The infrastructure and education to create awareness were nonexistence.
The capacity of stakeholders in emergency response was low; hence, they didn't have
the expertise to respond effectively until the international community came in to
assist."
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Significantly, some of the respondents indicated that although emergency
management agencies from sister West African countries did not directly move in to
support, the respective countries provided some other forms of support during the
crisis. Kwarteng, for instance, indicated that "ECOWAS supported a lot. Of course,
they helped in coordinating international support for expertise in terms of nurses from
countries abroad, from countries within Africa to lend their expertise to Sierra Leone.
Kwarteng further indicated that the Ghana NADMO provided training support
through the KAIPTC. Kwarteng recalled that “prior to the Ebola crisis, NADMO,
through the KAIPTC, has been providing a lot of support, training support to Sierra
Leone and especially officials from the and other assigned security agencies.”
Dwomoh indicated that ECOWAS did not directly send emergency management
experts; however, the regional body supported other countries with an early warning
during the crisis.
Summary
This chapter covered the essentials of how the study was conducted. The
researcher's discussion setting for the research, the demographics, data collection, and
data analysis. The researcher further discussed evidence of and the results of the
analyzed data. Five themes each emerged from both research questions. The themes,
which emerged from RQ1 included coordination, communication, and inclusion of
traditional and religious leaders. Other themes were the whole society approach and
control of the movement of people and cultural practices. Themes that emerged from
RQ2 were autonomy, leadership in coordination, planning border control, and
ECOWAS.
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RQ1 sought to find answers to the roles that were played by the non-medical
emergency management agencies of Liberia and Sierra Leone in responding to the
2014 Ebola crisis. The researcher discussed five dominant themes, including
coordination, communication, the inclusion of traditional and religious leaders, the
whole society approach, and control of the movement of people and cultural practices,
to answer RQ1. The inquiry revealed that during the crisis, the roles, which were
played by the emergency management agencies in the respective countries, included
coordination and communication. The individual agencies also used strategies such as
the inclusion of traditional and religious leaders, the whole society approach, and
control of cultural practices and movement of people to effectively respond to the
crisis
RQ2 sought to address the roles that should have been played by the nonmedical emergency management agencies of Liberia and Sierra Leone and similar
agencies in West Africa in responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis. The researcher
identified four themes in answering this question. These themes included were
autonomy, planning, border control, and ECOWAS. For RQ2, the study discovered
that the emergency management agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone lacked
autonomy and operated under government ministries under the names NDRC, and
Department of Disaster Management in the ONS, respectively. It was also evident
that before the Ebola crisis, there were no plausible Ebola response plans in place not
only in Liberia and Sierra Leone but also at the sub-regional level of ECOWAS.
Additionally, the research established that emergency management agencies from
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ECOWAS member states did not move to Liberia and Sierra Leone to support their
counterparts in the response during the crisis.
In Chapter 5, the researcher interprets the findings from the respective themes
under the two main research questions based on the professional experience of the
respondents. The researcher subsequently discussed the limitations of the study after
he makes recommendations for future studies. Afterward, the researcher discusses the
implications for social change as well as implications of the findings and
recommendations for policy-making and professional practice. Finally, the researcher
summarizes the entire research in the conclusion of the study.
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Chapter 5: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The Ebola crisis of 2014 was arguably the worst infectious epidemic in West
African history. Due to the nature of the epidemic, the initial response was more of a
medical response than it should have been. Although EMAs in afflicted countries
played key roles during the response, not much is known about the exact roles they
played and what roles they should have played from the perspective of EM experts.
The researcher sought to explain roles that were played or should have been
played by mandated nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the Ebola
crisis of 2014. The researcher also sought to find other roles that were played by
similar nonmedical EMAs from ECOWAS member states who assisted Liberia and
Sierra Leone during that crisis. The researcher used the generic qualitative inquiry as
the study’s methodology, with a focus on the pragmatic descriptive method. Data
were collected through interviews from EM experts from Liberia and Sierra Leone
who were part of the Ebola response in their respective countries during the 2014
crisis. Data were also collected from EM and subject matter experts from Ghana.
The study revealed that at the beginning of the crisis, the Ministries of Health
of the respective countries perceived the epidemic as a mere health crisis. The results
further revealed that the main roles played by the EMAs included coordination and
communication. The involvement of traditional and religious leaders, adopting a
whole society approach, and controlling the movement and cultural practices of the
population were identified as among the strategies used by EMAs in responding to the
crisis.
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The results of the study revealed that prior to and during the 2014 Ebola crisis,
EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone had no autonomy, but rather operated under other
government agencies. It was evident that in Liberia, the EMA operated under the
Ministry of Internal Affairs with the name NDRC. In Sierra Leone, the disaster
management agency operated as a department under the ONS. Furthermore, the study
revealed that planning and border control were key strategies that should have been
used by EMAs when responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis. Additionally, EMAs from
ECOWAS member states did not move to Liberia and Sierra Leone to help those
countries during the crisis, possibly due to the fear of being infected by the virus .
However, EMAs such as NADMO from Ghana, through the KAIPTC, helped to build
the capacity of EMAs in West Africa through training after the crisis.
Interpretation of the Findings
The researcher used the generic qualitative inquiry to investigate the roles that
were played and should have been played by nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra
Leone, as well as similar agencies from ECOWAS member states. Respondents not
only gave accounts of the roles their agencies played but also professional opinions on
what roles they thought the EMAs should have played during the Ebola crisis.
Themes which emerged from RQ1 included coordination, communication, and
inclusion of traditional and religious leaders. Other themes were the whole society
approach and control of the movement of people and cultural practices. For RQ2,
themes that emerged were autonomy, planning, border control, and ECOWAS.
The functionalist theory was the framework upon which this research was
based. The theory enabled the researcher to look critically at the respective roles of
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stakeholders in response to the 2014 Ebola crisis, with a focus on nonmedical
emergency management agencies. In light of this, the researcher identified the roles
that emergency management agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone played or should
have played in the 2014 Ebola crisis.
RQ1
RQ1: What roles did nonmedical EMAs of Liberia and Sierra Leone play
when responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis?
Theme 1: Coordination
Among the key responsibilities of EMAs during disasters is coordination. The
EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone played important coordination roles, but such roles
were delayed due to the initial perception of the epidemic as a health crisis. Key
among the coordination roles played by EMAs included offering strategic
coordination advice to respective governments and bringing to the table important
government stakeholders such as ministries, departments and agencies to work
together to respond to the crisis.
Between July and September 2014, the Government of Sierra Leone
established an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) which was primarily used for the
coordination of activities relating to the Ebola response. The EOC was mainly
managed under the Ministry of Health and Sanitation and was overseen by the
Minister for Health or the Chief Medical Officer. However, the ONS, an agency that
is mandated to coordinate emergency management in the country ,could have better
managed this oversight and coordination responsibility due to their links with all
important stakeholders in crisis coordination. According to Gbla (2018), because of
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the failure of the EOC, the government established the NERC, which included several
other stakeholders including security agencies.
In Liberia, in spite of the existence of the NDRC, the president set up a task
force to coordinate the response to the crisis. The president chaired the coordination
task force and made the Head of Disaster Relief Commission a cochair. Due to the
personal involvement and show of interest of the President, coupled with the fact that
the cochair was the appropriate office responsible for coordination of disasters, the
strategy worked and contributed to the effective response to the epidemic.
Initial coordination is crucial in response to every crisis, including what may
be perceived from the beginning as a health crisis. It is important for mandated EMAs
if properly set up and trained to be given a free hand to coordinate with all key
stakeholders to be able to respond appropriately to epidemics such as the Ebola crisis
before they escalate to the level where infections get out of control.
The role of EMAs in coordinating epidemics such as the Ebola crisis
highlights the importance of the need for institutions to play their mandated roles and
allowing other agencies to play their key functions to maintain a state of balance and
social equilibrium for the whole. The relegation of the ONS in Sierra Leone and
NDRC of Liberia to the background and interference with their mandated roles by
other institutions during the Ebola crisis contributed significantly to the initial
confusion and subsequent loss of lives.
Theme 2: Communication
Communication is extremely important in crisis response. At the beginning of
the Ebola crisis, a lot of misinformation was put in the public domain by various
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groups, either maliciously or unknowingly. Such misinformation increases the spread
of the disease and fatalities. Respondents noted that at the beginning of the crisis, the
population was misinformed about the EVD; it was after the emergency management
agencies got involved and changed the message before the rate of infections began to
go down. Previous studies found in during the review of literature revealed that
inadequate and misleading public education significantly contributed to the spread of
the virus. Among the misinformation that put in the public domain was that people
should not eat bush meat, and a consumption ban was subsequently put in place in
Guinea. This research revealed that beyond the misinformation on bushmeat, other
wrong information that was out in the public domain in Liberia and Sierra Leone
included; "When people are infected, and they go to the holding center, they will die;"
"if you are exposed to someone who has the virus, you would die." Another negative
information was "the moment you contract Ebola, you are dead."
This misinformation kept many infected people who could have received
proper care away from the holding centers, a situation that led to the death of many.
The emergency management agencies later changed and repackaged the
communication to; "when you come in contact with the virus or come in contact with
somebody who has the virus, and you report yourself to the health worker or to a
health facility or to a nearby center, you have a possibility, or there is a possibility
you will not die." Another information was “If you just wear the plastic hand or the
PPE and touch the stuff or infected people, that person will survive; it does not mean
you will die;" and also "when you contract the virus and seek early treatment, there is
a possibility for survival."
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These communication and public education interventions from EMA
significantly reduced the rate of infections. It is important to underscore that during
the initial stages of infectious epidemics, emergency management agencies must
collaborate with other institutions to ensure that the correct and accurate information
is put in the public domain to ensure that the population is well educated on the risks
involved, the right help available, and how much help can be received. This will
reduce infections and reduce fatalities.
Theme 3: Inclusion of Traditional and Religious Leaders
Available literature on previous studies did not highlight the importance of
including traditional and religious leaders in response to the Ebola crisis. In this study,
however, the respondents indicated that one of the key strategies their agencies
adopted was the inclusion of traditional and religious leaders in the response. The
traditional leaders were used to mobilize the communities to create awareness and
mobilize the communities to support the response to the Ebola crisis. It is important to
note that identifying opinion leaders to get communities to support emergency
management agencies in response to any disaster is crucial. Emergency management
officials need to understand that they have their roles as emergency management
experts, but without the buy-in of the communities, whatever plans irrespective of
how well thought out it might not yield the expected results if they do not have the
full support of the affected communities. Emergency management experts, therefore,
need to identify popular opinion leaders within communities and include such leaders
in their response plans even before a disaster happens.

112
Bearing in mind the theoretical framework, which guided this study, policy
makers need to understand the interconnectedness of various segments of society and
bring them together to achieve positive outcomes for the whole. In this study the
responses from the participants did not only highlight the importance of recognizing
the roles of other vital institutions such as traditional and religious leaders, but also
bringing such institutions together and allowing them to play their crucial roles in
response to the Ebola crisis.
Theme 4: Whole Society Approach
Engaging all the different facets of society is crucial in response to epidemics
that have a high rate of infection and a very high fatality rate. In this study, the
respondents indicated that employing the whole society approach helped in the
response. The functionalist theory states that, “society is a system of interconnected
parts that work together in harmony to maintain a state of balance and social
equilibrium for the whole" (Mooney et al., 2007, p. 1). Bearing this theory in mind,
EMAs need to understand that every society has its peculiarities. And it is significant
for EM experts to identify the peculiar structures of the society and use those
peculiarities in the emergency response. In responding to epidemics, a holistic kind of
approach is necessary for making sure that every sector or every level of society is
actively involved in preventing further spread of the epidemic. A holistic approach
from national to regional as well as within the community levels is of utmost
importance in managing crises such as the Ebola epidemic of 2014.
The level of involvement should be based on what each segment of the society
can do, and those segments should be included in the response plan. In Liberia,
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though this was done later, the emergency managers agencies identified that the
business community, school administrators, the local leaders, teachers, opinion
leaders, religious bodies, and churches all had roles to play in the Ebola response. The
inclusion of all these stakeholders contributed significantly to reducing the rate of
infections.
Theme 5: Control of Movement of People and Cultural Practices
Among the first measures to be put in place when managing epidemics that
spreads easily and has, the high mortality rate is to strictly ensure that the movement
of people is controlled to contain and localize the disease before it spreads further.
Previous literature on Ebola revealed that at the peak of the outbreak, Liberia and
Sierra Leone governments rolled out measures including the imposition of a state of
emergency, and quarantining large areas, to begin to tackle the epidemic. The
respondents corroborated this assertion and indicated that although this measure was
introduced later by the emergency management agencies, it was an important
measure, which helped in reducing the spread of the virus in those countries.
In addition, cultural practices, which are inimical to the response plan, need to
be controlled or discouraged. According to Gbla (2018), many sociocultural and
customary practices such as shaking hands, traditional ways of nursing the sick,
initiation rites, and burial rituals were identified as major causes of the rates of Ebola
transmission. Respondents in both Liberia and Sierra Leone indicated that the
emergency management agencies played crucial roles in getting the communities to
understand and subsequently changing such religious and cultural practices such as
bathing of the dead, and dignified burial practices to halt the spread of the virus.
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Significantly, when epidemics break out, it is important for emergency
management agencies to quickly identify cultural and religious practices that may be
inimical to the response plan. As part of the immediate response to epidemics, EMAs
need to educate the population well enough to prevent further spread resulting from
such practices.
RQ2
RQ2: What roles should nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone and
similar agencies in West Africa have played when responding to the 2014 Ebola
crisis?
Theme 6: Autonomy
In this study, EMAs in both Liberia and Sierra Leone lacked autonomy during
the crisis, a situation that contributed largely to the high mortality during the Ebola
crisis. Significantly, the mandated EMA in Liberia operated under the Ministry of
Interior as the NDRC. In Sierra Leone, the EMA operated and continues to operate as
a Department under the ONS. Respondents were of the professional opinion that as at
the time the Ebola crisis began if the EMAs were properly set up with the appropriate
autonomy and logistics support, these agencies could have contained the epidemic
before it spiraled beyond control.
It is important to underscore that even within the ONS, the emergency
management agency operates as just a department. Respondents were of the
professional view that if there were an autonomous emergency management agency in
Sierra Leone, the agency would have had the power to advise decision-makers against
putting the management of the Ebola epidemic under the Ministry of Health. In
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Liberia, All the respondents alluded to the fact that if an autonomous NDMA were in
existence at the time of the crisis, the response would have been more effective and
better coordinated.
It is imperative for politicians, policy, and decision-makers to understand that
disaster management agency, like any other professional body, has its roles to play as
a unit of society. When such agencies are given a free hand to perform their mandated
roles, in the society, their efficiency and experience increase with time to be able to
discharge their responsibilities to develop societies efficiently. Further, keeping
emergency agencies under government ministries dwarf the efforts of the emergency
management experts, especially if the political authority finds the professional work
of the emergency mangers as politically incorrect.
Theme 7: Planning
This research found that Ebola was never anticipated in Liberia and Sierra
Leone before the epidemic struck. As a result, no plans were in place to contain such
an epidemic in these countries. Some respondents from Sierra Leone were emphatic
that there were no response plans available to fall on during the crisis because Ebola
was never anticipated. This state of affairs led to confusion at the early stages of the
response leading to wrong decisions and subsequent fatalities. In Liberia, however, a
National Influenza Plan was partly in place but in draft form. This plan was taken out
of the shelves and updated at the peak of the crisis to respond to the epidemic.
The correct identification of potential threats and hazards that could affect a
country is important in preparing a requisite response plan. This research revealed that
the consequences of the absence of an anticipated and a well thought out plan lead to
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initial confusion and increased fatalities when an epidemic strikes. When emergency
management agencies in countries are well set up and resourced, they can remain
focused, undertake their unique mandated tasks as important segments of society, and
contribute positively to the entire society.
Policy and decision-makers must recognize the unique and important roles
emergency management agencies play in society and resource such agencies
appropriately. It is important for emergency management agencies to do a more
detailed analysis of global emergency issues and update their national disaster plans
accordingly before epidemics strike. Such an approach will prevent initial confusion
and subsequent mass fatalities when an epidemic such as the Ebola Virus Disease
strikes.
Theme 8: Border Control
Previous studies indicated that African countries such as Cameroun, Gambia,
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal stopped or limited air travels form all
Ebola-infected countries (Gronke, 2015 p 16). Other countries such as South Africa
refused entry to non-citizens and others on permanent residence status traveling from
the infected countries (p. 16). These moves were viewed as a mere response to
unfounded panic and stigmatization of nationals of the infected countries. However,
respondents thought that the disaster management agencies of Liberia and Sierra
Leone should have acted early enough to control movement across their borders to
prevent the spread of the disease. This view does not only corroborate the findings of
the research regarding border controls but also leads to the fact that although other
countries acted out of ignorance, fear, and stigmatization, such moves by these
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countries were justified to the extent that it prevented the spread of the virus to their
countries. Further, Liberia and Sierra Leone, whose nationals were stigmatized and
prevented from entering other countries, would have put in the same measures to
prevent other nationals from entering their countries if they had the opportunity to
prevent other infected nationals from entering their country.
Among the revelations of this research was the fact that the emergency
management agencies should have coordinated with other stakeholders and
counterparts in the other infected countries to control the movement of people across
the borders. The research revealed that due to the porous nature of borders between
the infected countries, people moved uncontrollably from one country to the other,
and in the process, spread the Ebola virus.
When dealing with epidemics with high infectious and fatality rates such as
EVD, emergency management agencies must collaborate with their counterparts to
prevent the movement of people across borders to prevent further spread of the
disease. Further, when epidemics such as the Ebola crisis happen elsewhere, it will be
necessary for emergency management agencies to immediately coordinate with the
appropriate agencies and put in border controls to prevent free movement of people
from the infected countries to avoid transporting the disease across countries.
Theme 9: ECOWAS
Most of the respondents indicated that no emergency management agencies
from sister West African countries moved in to help during the Ebola crisis, possibly
due to fear of being infected. The respondents, however, indicated that NADMO of
Ghana assisted with training and building the capacity of emergency management
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expertise in West Africa after the crisis through collaboration with the KAIPTC. The
study further revealed that, like the infected countries, ECOWAS as a sub-regional
body was caught unawares when the crisis began. ECOWAS had no plans in place to
deal with an epidemic at the magnitude of the Ebola Crisis. It is important EMAs of
West African countries to come together not only to develop emergency plans
together but also draw memoranda of understanding among themselves and have joint
simulation exercises and pieces of training to be able to respond to a crisis in the subregion appropriately.
Limitations of the Study
The study was qualitative in nature with a focus on descriptive methods. The
respondents were drawn from emergency management experts at different levels on
the respective hierarchies of their organization. Although the study produced credible
and detailed data on the roles of emergency management agencies during the Ebola
crisis of 2014, the study unavoidably has some limitations. One of the key limitations
of this study is the fact that the responses from participants were based on the
subjective professional experience from the limited roles they played during the Ebola
crisis. The responses from participants were, therefore, quite subjective and may not
represent the actual state of affairs as far as leadership and decision making in the
respective emergency management agencies were concerned.
Another limitation of the study was that the researcher could not determine the
level of bias of the respondents since the researcher did not collect data on how the
Ebola crisis may have individually affected the respondents. There remains the
possibility that respondents whose loved ones may have died because of the Ebola
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crisis would be less objective considering the roles they thought their agencies should
have played during the crisis.
In addition, although the researcher invited seven emergency management
experts from Liberia to be part of the study, only three of them willingly participated.
Consequently, the professional views from respondents from Liberia may not wholly
represent the functions of the emergency management agency of Liberia since other
EM experts in Liberia who are in the majority may have different views regarding the
roles played by their agency. In Sierra Leone, five out of seven emergency
management experts participated. Therefore, a possibility remains that the other
experts who did not participate in the study may hold contrary views to the responses
from the participants. Furthermore, the researcher did not collect any data from the
ECOWAS secretariat during the study. Therefore, the data collected from respondents
in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana may not be an accurate position of ECOWAS
regarding the roles ECOWAS played during the crisis.
Additionally, the researcher could not determine if the respondents were
truthful with their responses. Further, other stakeholders who played vital roles in
response to the Ebola epidemic in Liberia and Sierra Leone were not included in the
study. Consequently, there were no counter or corroborative views of other experts
outside of emergency management organizations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana,
who may have played critical roles during the Ebola crisis.
In spite of these limitations, the results of the study are credible and
trustworthy, because the data collection method and analysis were thorough. Data
collection and analysis were also subjected to scrutiny by the supervising committee
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of this study. Further, the researcher ensured that issues of trustworthiness were
properly addressed in the study.
Recommendations for Future Research
The data collected during this study revealed that at the onset of the Ebola
crisis, there was confusion and lack of direction due to misunderstanding and
classification of the Ebola crisis as a health issue. This led to the ministries of health
of the respective agencies assuming leadership in coordination. Previous studies did
not address the actual relationships that existed between the respective ministries of
health and emergency management agencies. In addition, this study does not address
the level of cooperation that existed between disaster management agencies and
respective Ministries of Health in Liberia and Sierra Leone before the Ebola crisis. It
is therefore recommended that future research should focus on the level of
coordination and cooperation that exists between emergency management agencies
and ministries of health in the respective countries, with the view to streamlining that
relationship to ensure effective leadership in coordination during a response to
epidemics.
Additionally, during the data collection, the researcher observed that some of
the respondents were keen on describing their personal experiences, loss of their
loved ones to the Ebola Virus, and the trauma emergency management experts went
through during the Ebola crisis. During the review of the literature, the researcher did
not come across any research on the trauma emergency management experts went
through in the performance of their duties during the Ebola crisis. It will be
worthwhile for a further study into the psychological trauma emergency management
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experts went through during the 2014 Ebola crisis, and the impact such trauma may
have had on the performance of their duties.
Implications
Implications for Social Change
This study may contribute to social change in the area of policymaking at both
international and national levels as well as for various emergency management
experts in various countries. The findings and recommendations of this study
stipulate policy direction for ECOWAS at the international level concerning
developing SOPs and MOU to bind disaster management agencies to respond to
epidemics in various member states. At the national level, the findings and
recommendations provide insight into giving autonomy to emergency management
agencies and delinking these agencies from government ministries. At the
organization level, the study highlights the importance of emergency management
agencies to plan for unfamiliar hazards and establishing their authority at the initial
stages of epidemics to lead the coordination efforts during the response to unfamiliar
disasters.
All these policy directions would contribute positively to social change
through how non-medical emergency management agencies would respond to
epidemics that afflict countries and transcend international boundaries in the future.
Significantly, this study contributes positively to the body of knowledge on how
emergency management agencies responded to the 2014 Ebola crisis in Liberia and
Sierra Leone.
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Implications for Policymaking and Professional Practice
As already mentioned in the impact this study will make on social change, the
findings, recommendations of this study highlight the importance of this research for
policymaking both at county and ECOWAS sub-regional level as well for
professional practice by emergency management experts.
Delinking EMAs from Government Agencies
Delinking EMAs from government ministries and giving them autonomy is
crucial for an effective and professional approach to emergency response. Keeping
EMAs under government ministries dwarfs the efforts of the emergency management
experts when emergencies occur. When such agencies are given a free hand and the
autonomy to perform their mandated roles in the society, their efficiency and
experience increase with time in the discharge of their responsibilities to develop
societies. It is important for politicians, policy, and decision-makers to understand
that disaster management agencies, like any other professional body, have their roles
to play as important components of society.
Policymakers in countries that still have their emergency management
agencies operating as departments and directorates under government ministries
should, therefore, make efforts to have appropriate legislation passed to establish
autonomous emergency management agencies and resource them appropriately to
play their roles as important components of society.
Planning for Unfamiliar Hazards
Planning for disasters is an extremely important part of emergency
management. Emergency management agencies must develop comprehensive plans to
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include all stakeholders and exercise such plans before disasters occur. Although an
all-hazards approach to emergency management may suffice, when unfamiliar
disasters occur, initial confusion among stakeholders in disaster management leads to
several fatalities. Disaster management experts must, therefore, study the global trend
of disasters and identify unfamiliar hazards in their countries that have the potential to
not only afflict their countries but also has the potential to transcend international
boundaries, and accordingly plan for them.
Beyond planning, early warning mechanisms, timely information sharing, and
effective border control are crucial in responding to epidemics that transcend
international boundaries. Governments and policymakers should, therefore,
adequately resource emergency management agencies to be able to deal with cross
border epidemics effectively.
Timely Initial Leadership in Coordination
At the onset of the Ebola crisis, the Ministries of Health of Liberia and Sierra
Leone took leadership in the coordination to the response. In Sierra Leone, it was not
until the Ministry of Health was overwhelmed that a decision was made to set up the
National Emergency Response Center, which was later managed by the ONS. It is
imperative for policymakers and emergency management experts to exert their
authority and take the early lead in coordinating the response to epidemics. All
stakeholders, including respective ministries of health, should realize that in
emergency management, playing their properly ascribed functions in society for
which they have been trained, leads to the collective success of a disaster
management response plan.
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According to the functionalist theory, upon which this study is based, "society
is a system of interconnected parts that work together in harmony to maintain a state
of balance and social equilibrium for the whole" (Mooney et al., 2007 p. 1). Ministries
of Health should play their roles in case management and focus on the treatment of
infected people, and leave the broader leadership in coordination to the competent
emergency management professionals to handle. This can be achieved through the
engagement of all stakeholders, ineffective planning for unfamiliar emergencies.
Development of MOU and SOPs on EM for ECOWAS Member States
In this study, it was evident that there are no sub-regional emergency
management agencies in West Africa. It was equally clear there is no mechanism in
place that bound emergency management agencies from respective ECOWAS
countries to respond to epidemics in other member states and disasters that transcend
international boundaries. ECOWAS as a sub-regional body should engage emergency
management experts from member states to develop comprehensive Standard
Operations Procedures and Memorandum of Understanding among the member states
to commit them to respond to emergencies in the sub-region. Furthermore, disaster
management agencies in West Africa should hold joint pieces of training and
exercises to prepare themselves in readiness to respond to the crisis in the sub-region.
Additionally, ECOWAS should set up an emergency management standby body as
part of its headquarters to coordinate a response to disasters that affect member states.
Conclusion
This generic qualitative inquiry focused on the roles emergency management
agencies played or should have played during the Ebola crisis of 2014. I had served in
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Sierra Leone as a solider almost two decades ago and as an international civil servant
in Liberia at the peak of the Ebola crisis. Therefore, when I embarked on this journey
in my quest for higher academic laurels, I decided to conduct this study to contribute
my quota to the body of knowledge in emergency management in these two
wonderful countries. The researcher identified participants through purposive
sampling and collected data from emergency management experts in Liberia and
Sierra Leone, as well as Ghana through interviews. All the respondents willingly
participated and provided very useful information for further analysis. I subsequently
used an inductive thematic analysis approach to analyze the data. The findings of the
research indicated that during the crisis, the roles, which were played by the
emergency management agencies in the respective countries, included coordination
and communication. The respective agencies also used strategies such as the inclusion
of traditional and religious leaders, the whole society approach, and control of cultural
practices and movement of people to effectively respond to the crisis.
The research also established that the emergency management agencies in
Liberia and Sierra Leone lacked autonomy and operated under government ministries
under the names NDRC, and Department of Disaster Management in the ONS,
respectively. The findings also showed that prior to the Ebola crisis, there were no
plausible Ebola response plans in place not only in Liberia and Sierra Leone but also
at the sub-regional level of ECOWAS. Respondents further indicated that border
control was a strategy that should have been used to prevent the spread of the Ebola
Virus Disease to other infected countries when the outbreak started in Guinea.
Finally, the research established that emergency management agencies from
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ECOWAS member states did not move to Liberia and Sierra Leone to support their
counterparts in the response during the crisis.
The recommendations in the studies include: the need to delinking emergency
management agencies from government agencies, the requirement to plan for
unfamiliar hazards; the importance of timely initial leadership in coordination; and the
need for ECOWAS to development MOUs and SOPs on emergency management for
the ECOWAS Member States. This research is significant and may provide policy
direction to policymakers at the international and country levels as well as guidance
for emergency management experts.
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Appendix A: Invitation Letter to Participants

Dear ... (name of participant) .....
My name is Eugene Owusu Afrifa, and I am a doctoral student of Public Policy and
Administration (Emergency Management) at Walden University of the United States
of America. I am conducting a research on the topic “Ebola Outbreak in Liberia and
Sierra Leone: Role of Non-Medical Emergency Management Agencies” I obtained
your contact information from the Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training
Center. I would like to invite you to participate in this study as a respondent. If you
agree to participate, I will arrange an interview at a time and neutral public location of
your convenience. The interview would last for about 45 minutes and will be very
formal. My goal in this study will be to learn about the roles played by the mandated
non-medical emergency management agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone, at the
national level, and such similar agencies at the regional (West Africa) level in
managing the Ebola epidemic of 2014. I can assure you that I will share the results of
the study with you. In addition, please note participation in this study is optional, and
you may withdraw at any point of the process.
I have provided further details of the study in the attached consent form. Your
signature on this form means you understand the information I presented and you
want to willingly participate. Please do not hesitate to contact me for any further
clarification.

Thank you.
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Appendix B: Consent Form
RQ1
Dear ..... (Name of respondent)......
You are invited to take part in a research study about roles played by emergency
management agencies during epidemics. The title of the study is “Ebola Outbreak in
Liberia and Sierra Leone: Role of Non-Medical Emergency Management Agencies”
The researcher is inviting emergency management experts from Ghana, Liberia and
Sierra Leone. This form is part of a process called “informed consent” to make you
understand this study before deciding whether to take part.
Eugene Owusu Afrifa who is a PhD student at Walden University is conducting this
study. You might already know the researcher as a professional field security
coordination officer of the United Nations, but this study is completely different from
that role.
Background Information:
The purpose of this qualitative study is to learn about the roles played by the mandated
non-medical emergency management agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone, at the
national level, and such similar agencies at the regional (West Africa) level in managing
the Ebola epidemic of 2014
Procedures:
The interview will be audio recorded, and if you agree to be in this study, you will be
asked to:
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫

Sign the informed consent form to indicate your willingness to participate in the
interview process
Grant a face-to-face interview with the researcher for about 45 minutes at a time
and location convenient to you or via telephone.
Discuss your understanding of the 2014 Ebola crisis in Liberia and Sierra Leone,
and how it was managed by non-medical emergency management agencies.
Review the transcript of the recorded interview discussion to validate and correct
your answers.

The main research question is: How did the non-medical emergency management
agencies of Liberia and Sierra Leone respond to the 2014 Ebola crisis?
Sub questions will include:
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⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫

What is your understanding of crisis response to an epidemic such as the Ebola
crisis?
What role did your agency play in responding to the Ebola crisis?
If your agency played any roles what strategy did they use?
What roles do you think your agency should have played in responding to the
crisis?
Which other agencies do you think should have played key roles in the response?

Voluntary Nature of the Study:
This study is voluntary. You are free to accept or turn down the invitation. Any person
or organization will not treat you differently if you decide not to be in the study. If you
decide to be in the study now, you can still change your mind later.
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:
Being in this type of study involves some risk of the minor discomforts that can be
encountered in daily life, such as recall of crisis experiences and being stressed. Being
in this study would not pose a risk to your safety or wellbeing.
Although the research may not benefit you directly as an individual, it will contribute
immensely to policymaking at national and regional levels with regard to the roles
emergency management agencies would play in the management of future epidemics
in countries as well as those that afflict a region such as West Africa.
Payment:
There are no payments or special gifts for participants for granting the interview.
However, there will be an immediate cash reimbursement of up to an equivalent of
Fifty US dollars (USD$50) for transportation to an agreed venue outside of your
office premises.
Privacy:
Reports coming out of this study will not share the identities of individual participants.
Details that might identify participants, such as the location of the study, also will not
be shared. The researcher will not use your personal information for any purpose
outside of this research project. Data will be kept secure with data security measures
including password protection, data encryption, use of codes in place of names, and
storing names separately from the data. Data will be kept for at least five years, as
required by the university.
Contacts and Questions:
You may ask any questions you have now. Further, if you have questions later, you may
contact the researcher via telephone number +234 (0)909 442 4211 or via WhatsApp
on +233244 224 248. You may also reach the researcher via email address as
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eugene.owusuafrifa@waldenu.edu. If you want to talk privately about your rights as a
participant, you can call the Research Participant Advocate at my university at +1 612312-1210. Walden University's approval number for this study is 07-10-19-0662843
and it expires on July 9, 2020.
The researcher will give you a copy of this form to keep.
Obtaining Your Consent
If you understand the study well enough to decide it, please indicate your consent by
signing below.
Printed Name of Participant
Date of consent
Participant’s Signature
Researcher’s Signature

Thank you.

Consent Form: RQ2
Dear ..... (Name of respondent)......
You are invited to take part in a research study about roles played by emergency
management agencies during epidemics. The title of the study is “Ebola Outbreak in
Liberia and Sierra Leone: Role of Non-Medical Emergency Management Agencies”
The researcher is inviting emergency management experts from Ghana, Liberia and
Sierra Leone. This form is part of a process called “informed consent” to make you
understand this study before deciding whether to take part.
Eugene Owusu Afrifa who is a PhD student at Walden University is conducting this
study. You might already know the researcher as a professional field security
coordination officer of the United Nations, but this study is completely different from
that role.
Background Information:
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The purpose of this qualitative study is to learn about the roles played by the mandated
non-medical emergency management agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone, at the
national level, and such similar agencies at the regional (West Africa) level in managing
the Ebola epidemic of 2014
Procedures:
The interview will be audio recorded, and if you agree to be in this study, you will be
asked to:
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫

Sign the informed consent form to indicate your willingness to participate in the
interview process
Grant a face-to-face interview with the researcher for about 30 minutes at a time
and location convenient to you or via telephone.
Discuss your understanding of the 2014 Ebola crisis in Liberia and Sierra Leone,
and how it was managed by non-medical emergency management agencies.
Review the transcript of the recorded interview discussion to validate and correct
your answers.

The main research question is;
How effective was the emergency management response to the Ebola pandemic at the
national and regional levels?
Sub questions will include
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫

If your agency played any key roles, how successful were the strategies used?
Could there be any other plausible strategy that was not used or could have been
used?
Did other emergency management agencies in West Africa assist in the response?
Was there any intervention from the Economic Community of West Africa States
(ECOWAS)?
How did your response help in dealing with the crisis?
How did ECOWAS response help in dealing with the crisis?

Voluntary Nature of the Study:
This study is voluntary. You are free to accept or turn down the invitation. Any person
or organization will not treat you differently if you decide not to be in the study. If you
decide to be in the study now, you can still change your mind later.
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:
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Being in this type of study involves some risk of the minor discomforts that can be
encountered in daily life, such as recall of crisis experiences and being stressed. Being
in this study would not pose a risk to your safety or wellbeing.
Although the research may not benefit you directly as an individual, it will contribute
immensely to policymaking at national and regional levels with regard to the roles
emergency management agencies would play in the management of future epidemics
in countries as well as those that afflict a region such as West Africa.
Payment:
There are no payments or special gifts for participants for granting the interview.
However, there will be an immediate cash reimbursement of up to an equivalent of
Fifty US dollars (USD$50) for transportation to an agreed venue outside of your
office premises.
Privacy:
Reports coming out of this study will not share the identities of individual participants.
Details that might identify participants, such as the location of the study, also will not
be shared. The researcher will not use your personal information for any purpose
outside of this research project. Data will be kept secure with data security measures
including password protection, data encryption, use of codes in place of names, and
storing names separately from the data. Data will be kept for at least five years, as
required by the university.
Contacts and Questions:
You may ask any questions you have now. Further, if you have questions later, you may
contact the researcher via telephone number +234 (0)909 442 4211 or via WhatsApp
on +233244 224 248. You may also reach the researcher via email address as
eugene.owusuafrifa@waldenu.edu. If you want to talk privately about your rights as a
participant, you can call the Research Participant Advocate at my university at +1 612312-1210. Walden University's approval number for this study is 07-10-19-0662843
and it expires on July 9, 2020.
The researcher will give you a copy of this form to keep.
Obtaining Your Consent
If you understand the study well enough to decide it, please indicate your consent by
signing below.
Printed Name of Participant
Date of consent
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Participant’s Signature
Researcher’s Signature

Thank you.

